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Beyond the Self-Execution Analysis:  Rationalizing Constitutional, Treaty  






International commercial arbitration has long been considered one of the paradigmatic forms of 
private international law and has achieved a degree of legitimacy that is virtually unparalleled in 
the international realm.  However, significant questions have recently begun to arise about the 
device’s public international attributes, stemming largely from a circuit split regarding the nature 
of the New York Convention, the leading treaty in the field, and Chapter 2 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, which helps give effect to the Convention in the United States.   
 
Efforts have been made to place the debate about the New York Convention within the context 
of post-Medellin jurisprudence concerning self-executing treaties.  However, that framework 
does not adequately address the difficult constitutional question as to what course should be 
adopted when a particular issue is governed by both a treaty and a statute that is meant to 
incorporate that treaty into domestic law.   
 
This Article addresses that question by considering the role of and relationship between the New 
York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act, and by providing a robust analysis of the 
constitutional, statutory and public international issues that arise in cases involving international 
treaties and incorporative statues.   Although the discussion is rooted in the context of 
international commercial arbitration, the Article provides important theoretical and practical 
insights that are equally applicable in other types of public international law. 
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According to the U.S. Constitution, treaties entered into by the United States constitute “the 
supreme Law of the Land” and are binding on all state and federal courts.1  The U.S. Supreme 
Court has similarly recognized the supremacy of international treaties and the role of the courts 
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 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2; see also id. art. III, §2, cl. 1. 
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in enforcing those instruments, stating that “[i]nternational law . . . is part of our law, and must 
be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice” of this country.2   
As straightforward as these principles may seem, they have nevertheless generated a 
considerable amount of controversy over the years, both as a matter of international and 
constitutional law.
3
  However, there is often little overlap between constitutional and 
international analyses,
4
 and courts and commentators typically avoid the “difficult constitutional 
question” as to what course should be adopted when a particular issue is governed by both a 
treaty and a statute that is meant to incorporate that treaty into domestic law.
5
  Although a 
number of interpretive devices exist to help courts deal with these issues,
6
 these mechanisms 
only go so far and are often more popular in theory than in practice.
7
 
                                                          
2
 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895). 
3
 See John F. Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 655, 657-58 
(2010) (“There have been spirited debates as to the precise domestic legal status of properly ratified 
treaties, the scope of the power of the federal courts to construe ambiguous statutes in a manner consistent 
with international law, the correctness of the Supreme Court’s practice of relying on international sources 
when interpreting the Constitution, and the extent to which customary international law has the status of 
federal common law.”).   
4
 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 
1762, 1764 (2009) (noting authorities have seldom considered “the force of international law as a matter 
of the constitutional law of the United States”).  Furthermore, ”[f]ew international law scholars are also 
serious U.S. constitutional scholars.”  Id. 
5
 Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714, 732-33 (5th Cir. 
2009) (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (footnote omitted), cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety 
Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010); 
Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 540, 541, 
547-50 (2008) [hereinafter Bradley, Intent]; Coyle, supra note 3, at 657-58, 660-61.  
6
 These mechanisms range from the Charming Betsy canon to the last-in-time rule.  See Curtis A. 
Bradley, The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 91 
[hereinafter Bradley, Judicial Power]; see also Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 
2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131, 161 [hereinafter Bradley, Duality]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words:  
Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 990, 1099-1105 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 26, 97-108 (1994) (listing various interpretive canons used in U.S. courts); Alex 
Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When it is a Treaty We Are Expounding, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1243, 1307-23 (2005); Oona A. Hathaway et al., International Law at Home:  Enforcing Treaties in U.S. 
Courts, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 51, 76-105 (2012); David H. Moore, Do U.S. Courts Discriminate Against 
Treaties?:  Equivalence, Duality, and Non-Self-Execution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2228, 2270-78 (2010) 
[hereinafter Moore, Duality]; John T. Parry, Congress, The Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of 
4 
 
Furthermore, some areas of law remain outside standard jurisprudential analyses.  For 
example, international commercial arbitration has been largely overlooked by scholars in both 
constitutional and public international law,
8
 although a recent circuit split regarding the 
relationship between the leading treaty on international commercial arbitration (the 1958 United 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, more 
commonly known as the New York Convention)
9
 and Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA))
10
 has generated a spate of commentary in the area of insurance disputes.
11
  
The absence of any detailed analysis of the constitutional and public international 
attributes of international commercial arbitration is somewhat strange, given the ever-increasing 
amount of international trade in the world and arbitration’s status as the preferred means of 
resolving cross-border commercial disputes.
12
  However, this omission is perhaps reflective of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Treaties, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1209, 1209 (2009); Lauren Ann Ross, Note, Using Foreign Relations 
Law to Limit Extraterritorial Application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 DUKE L.J. 445, 479 
(2012). 
7
 See Roger P. Alford, The Internationalization of Legal Relations, 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 146, 
147 (2002) [hereinafter Alford, Internationalization]; Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 
VA. L. REV. 1573, 1646-47 (2011). 
8
 See Ronald G. Goss, Can State Laws Prevent International Arbitration of Insurance Disputes Under the 
New York Convention? 65 DISP. RESOL. J. 14, 93 (Nov. 2010-Jan. 2011) (noting “[t]here are . . . a host of 
treaty interpretations doctrines . . . that have never been addressed by a court” in the context of 
international commercial arbitration, including “the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, the Charming Betsy 
Canon, and the Last-in-Time Rule”). 
9
 See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]; GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 92 (2009).   
10
 See 9 U.S.C. §§201-08 (2012). 
11
 See ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 390-91 (4
th
 Cir. 2012); Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. 
v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. La. 
Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 131 S. Ct. 65 
(2010); Suter v. Munich Reins. Co., 223 F.3d 150, 162 (3d Cir. 2000); Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 
F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995); see also infra note 75 and accompanying text.   
12
 See BORN, supra note 9, at 68; see also Christopher A. Whytock, The Arbitration-Litigation 
Relationship in Transnational Dispute Resolution:  Empirical Insights From the U.S. Federal Courts, 2 
WORLD ARB. & MED. REV. 39, 43-52 (2008) [hereinafter Whytock, Relationship]; Christopher A. 
Whytock, Private-Public Interaction in Global Governance:  The Case of Transnational Commercial 
Arbitration, 12 BUS. & POL. 1, 6-8 (2010) [hereinafter Whytock, Private-Public].  The number of cases 
filed in U.S. courts and relating to international commercial arbitration has risen exponentially in recent 
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several larger problems relating to the perception of international commercial arbitration in the 
legal community at large.  
First, international commercial arbitration is often considered in the same light as 
consumer, employment and labor arbitration, even though international proceedings are much 
more sophisticated than domestic forms of arbitration and reflect little of the informality 
commonly associated with other types of arbitral proceedings.
13
  This lack of understanding 
about the nature of international commercial arbitration could lead some non-specialists to 
conclude that the field is not worthy of serious scholarly scrutiny.
14
 
Second, international commercial arbitration is often characterized primarily, if not 
exclusively, as a form of private international law.
15
  While it is certainly true that the device is 
used to resolve disputes between private actors (including states behaving as private actors
16
), 
international commercial arbitration also constitutes a form of public international law,
17
 as 
illustrated by the central role played by the New York Convention and other international treaties 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
years, with commentators suggesting that as many as 1,800 matters are heard per year.  See S.I. Strong, 
Border Skirmishes:  The Intersection Between Litigation and International Commercial Arbitration, 2012 
J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2-3 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, Borders]; see also Whytock, Relationship, supra, at 58-
67, 75-79. 
13
 See BORN, supra note 9, at 1746; S.I. STRONG, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:  A 
GUIDE FOR U.S. JUDGES 4-5 (2012) [hereinafter STRONG, GUIDE], available at http://www.fjc.gov. 
14
 See S.I. Strong, Research in International Commercial Arbitration:  Special Skills, Special Sources, 20 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 119, 122-24 (2009) [hereinafter Strong, Sources].   
15
 See Julian G. Ku, The Crucial Role of States and Private International Law Treaties:  A Model for 
Accommodating Globalization, 73 MO. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2008).     
16
 See 28 U.S.C. §1605 (2012); S.I. Strong, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Against Foreign States or 
State Agencies, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 335, 336-38 (2006) [hereinafter Strong, FSIA]. 
17
 See EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE, FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶¶205, 247-300 (1999) [hereinafter FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN]; W. 
Michael Reisman & Heide Iravani, The Changing Relation of National Courts and International 
Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 5, 5-6 (2010); Leon E. Trakman, “Legal Traditions” 
and International Commercial Arbitration, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 26 (2006); Christopher A. 
Whytock, Litigation, Arbitration, and the Transnational Shadow of the Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L 
L. 449, 465-75 (2008). 
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in the enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards.
18
  In fact, with over 145 states parties, 
the New York Convention is one of the most successful commercial treaties in the world, which 
suggests it is both impossible as well as inappropriate to ignore the public international attributes 
of international commercial arbitration.
19
   Indeed, there currently appears to be a resurgence of 
interest in international commercial arbitration qua public international law.
20
 
Third, international commercial arbitration is often framed as a practical rather than a 
doctrinal discipline, a phenomenon that appears to be closely tied to the fact that arbitral awards 
do not create formal precedent.
21
  However, courts can become involved in arbitral disputes in a 
                                                          
18
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial 
Regulation, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 685, 704 (2012); see also Organization of American States, Inter-American 
Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards (Montevideo 
Convention), May 14, 1979, 1439 U.N.T.S. 87; Inter-American Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975) [hereinafter Panama Convention]; 
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr 21, 1964, 484 U.N.T.S. 364; BORN, 
supra note 9, at 91-109.  These other treaties are regional in nature, and the United States is a state party 
to one, the Panama Convention.  See Panama Convention, supra.  Chapter 3 of the FAA describes the 
relationship between the Panama Convention and domestic U.S. law.  See id.; 9 U.S.C. §§301-07 (2012).  
Although there are a number of important differences between the Panama and New York Conventions, 
Congress has indicated that the two are to be construed in a similar manner.  See House Report No. 501, 
101
st
 Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 675, 678; DRC, Inc. v. Republic of 
Honduras, 774 F.Supp.2d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 2011); Employers Ins. of Wasau v. Banco Seguros Del Estado, 
34 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1120 (E.D. Wis.), aff’d, 199 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1999); BORN, supra note 9, at 104; 
John P. Bowman, The Panama Convention and its Implementation Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 1-2, 19-20 (2000).  Therefore, this Article will focus solely on the New York 
Convention.  See New York Convention, supra note 9. 
19
 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Status: 1958 Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http:// 
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_ status.html (last visited Jan. 3, 
2012) [hereinafter New York Convention Status]; see also New York Convention, supra note 9; BORN, 
supra note 9, at 91-105; FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 17, ¶¶190-192, 247-300.   
20
 See Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L. J. 775, 778-81, 864-67 
(2012) [hereinafter Born, Adjudication]; Alex Mills, Rediscovering the Public Dimension of Private 
International Law, 24 HAGUE Y.B. INT’L L. 2011, 13, 20-21; S.I. Strong, Monism and Dualism in 
International Commercial Arbitration:  Overcoming Barriers to Consistent Application of Principles of 
Public International Law, in BASIC CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:  MONISM & DUALISM 
__ (Marko Novaković ed., forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Strong, Monism and Dualism]; Whytock, 
Private-Public, supra note 12, at 1-2.   
21
 See Ernest A. Young, Supranational Rulings as Judgments and Precedents, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L 
L. 477, 501-09 (2008) [hereinafter Young, Supranational].  However, some types of soft precedent do 
exist.  See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse? 23 ARB. INT’L 
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variety of ways and, as a result, produce binding precedent relating to arbitration.
22
  Furthermore, 
the international arbitral community encourages the publication of arbitral awards in denatured 
(redacted) form, thus allowing scholars and practitioners to engage in increasingly sophisticated 
studies of arbitral as well as judicial behavior.
23
  Together, these sources support a diverse range 
of doctrinal analyses.  Although the field remains somewhat under-theorized,
24
 one area that has 
received an increasing amount of interest involves the intersection between arbitration and 
constitutional law.
25
   
 Much of the existing constitutional analysis relates to domestic arbitration, which creates 
an unfortunate lacuna in the international realm.  While there have been several recent attempts 
to rationalize the U.S. approach to international commercial arbitration, including the American 
Law Institute’s development of a Restatement of the U.S. Law of International Commercial 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
357, 361-78 (2007); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1895, 1909-10 (2010). 
22
 See BORN, supra note 9, at 418; STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 13, at 37-87.  But see Julian D.M. Lew, 
Achieving the Dream: Autonomous Arbitration, 22 ARB. INT’L 179, 180 (2006).  
23
 These awards appear in various yearbooks and electronic databases.  See S.I. STRONG, RESEARCH AND 
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:  SOURCES AND STRATEGIES 26-27, 83-85 
(2009) [hereinafter STRONG, RESEARCH]; see also infra note 353 and accompanying text. 
24
 See EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2-3 (2010); see also 
BORN, supra note 9, at 184-86; JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION ¶¶5-1 to 5-33 (2003).   
25
 See PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013); see also Gary B. Born, 
Arbitration and the Freedom to Associate, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7, 17-19, 21-23 (2009) [hereinafter 
Born, Freedom]; Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 186, 210-14 
(2006); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6-51; Richard C. 
Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil 
Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 989-1104 (2000); Jean Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the 
Supreme Court’s Preference for Biding Arbitration:  A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of 
Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997); S.I. Strong, International Arbitration and 
the Republic of Colombia:  Commercial, Comparative and Constitutional Concerns From a U.S. 
Perspective, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 47, 99-105 (2011); Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding:  






 and the Federal Judicial Center’s publication of a judge’s guide on international 
commercial arbitration,
27
 more work remains to be done.  This Article therefore attempts to fill 
this gap in the literature by considering international commercial arbitration from a constitutional 
and public international law perspective.  
Although the matters discussed herein are often of a highly theoretical nature, they also 
have significant practical value given the growing number of questions regarding the relationship 
between the New York Convention and the FAA.
28
  For example, not only has a circuit split 
recently emerged regarding the application of the New York Convention to international 
insurance disputes,
29
 but there has also been a longstanding controversy among U.S. courts 
regarding form requirements (i.e., the type of writing that is necessary to reflect an arbitration 
agreement) in disputes involving the Convention.
30
  Form requirements are an especially critical 
issue in international arbitration, since they dictate whether a particular arbitral agreement or 
award is governed by the New York Convention.
31
  Certiorari has been sought on these issues on 
                                                          
26
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
(forthcoming) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION]; George A. 
Bermann, Restating the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 175, 175-99 (2009). 
27
 See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 13.  The Federal Judicial Center is the research and education arm of 
the U.S. federal judiciary.  See Federal Judicial Center, http://www.fjc.gov. 
28
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; 9 U.S.C. §§1-307 (2012). 
29
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; see also supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text; see also 
infra notes 79-122 and accompanying text. 
30
 New York Convention, supra note 9, arts. II, IV(1), V(1)(a); Kahn Lucas Lancaster Inc. v. Lark Int’l 
Ltd., 186 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1999), partially abrogated on other grounds by Sarhank Group v. Oracle 
Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 660 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005); Sphere Drake Ins. plc v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666 
(5
th
 Cir. 1994); see also Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2005); Smith/Enron 
Cogeneration Ltd. P’ship, Inc. v. Smith Cogeneration Int’l Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1999); BORN, 
supra note 9, at 580-81; S.I. Strong, What Constitutes an “Agreement in Writing” in International 
Commercial Arbitration?  Conflicts Between the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act, 
48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 47, 58-78 (2012) [hereinafter Strong, Writing]. 
31
 See New York Convention, supra note 9, arts. II, IV(1), V(1)(a); BORN, supra note 9, at 580-81; 





 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s ongoing fascination with arbitration 
suggests that it is only a matter of time before the Court turns its attention to the intersection 
between constitutional and public international law.
33
 
The specific issue addressed in this Article involves the “difficult constitutional question” 
regarding what courts should do when faced with both a treaty and a statute designed to provide 
some sort of support for the domestic application of that treaty.
34
  Although this inquiry 
obviously triggers the debate about self-executing and non-self-executing treaties,
35
 the issue, as 
it is presented in the arbitral context, is much more complex than mere self-execution.  
Furthermore, this precise question has seldom been addressed in any context, let alone 
international commercial arbitration.
36
   
While this Article focuses on the specific language of the New York Convention and the 
FAA, the discussion nevertheless provides important insights to lawyers and jurists working in a 
wide variety of subject matter areas, since the analysis addresses certain theoretical concerns that 
                                                          
32
 See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009), 
cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s London, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010) (regarding an insurance dispute); Strong, Writing, supra note 30, at 
49 & n. 5 (listing six recent petitions for certiorari in the area of form requirements).   
33
 In the past five years, the Supreme Court has heard eight arbitration cases, with two additional cases set 
for argument this Term.  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Granite Rock 
Co. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010); Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 
S. Ct. 2772 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); Arthur 
Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009); 
Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262 (2009); Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 
576 (2008); Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 
3070 (2012); In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 81 U.S.L.W. 3070 (2012). 
34
 Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 732-33 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (footnote omitted); Coyle, 
supra note 3, at 657-58, 660-61.   
35
 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314-15 (1829), overruled on other grounds by United States 
v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833); Moore, Duality, supra note 6, at 2229; see infra notes 79-
121 and accompanying text.   
36
 See Coyle, supra note 3, at 657-58, 660-61.   
10 
 
have been largely ignored by both courts and commentators.
37
  In fact, international commercial 
arbitration constitutes an ideal context in which to debate these kinds of larger issues, since the 
fifty-year history of the New York Convention provides researchers with a degree of empirical 
and comparative data unknown in other areas of law.
38
  Furthermore, arbitration has achieved a 
level of legitimacy to which other types of international adjudication can only aspire, thus 
providing an additional reason why this field is particularly worthy of study.
39
    
The discussion proceeds as follows.  First, section II sets the stage by putting 
international commercial arbitration into a public international law context and applying standard 
analytical concepts to practices that have primarily been considered as a matter of private 
international law.  Although this Article does not attempt to resolve the issue about whether and 
to what extent the New York Convention is self-executing under U.S. law, this section provides 
an overview of the current circuit split so as to provide the foundation for later discussions.
40
 
Next, Section III considers the interpretation and implementation of the New York 
Convention as a matter of both theory and practice.
41
  This inquiry, though arising in the context 
of arbitration, should be useful even to those working in other fields, since international 
commercial arbitration’s long and active history constitutes what might be called a laboratory for 
statutory and treaty interpretation.  This section discusses certain empirical data developed by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and includes a detailed 
                                                          
37
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; 9 U.S.C. §§1-307 (2012). 
38
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; see also infra notes 141, 353 and accompanying text.   
39
 See Mark L. Movsesian, International Commercial Arbitration and International Courts, 18 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 423, 448 (2008); Young, Supranational, supra note 21, at 477. 
40
 See New York Convention, supra note 9. 
41
 See id.  
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evaluation of the structural and conceptual challenges that can arise when a U.S. court is asked to 
interpret Chapter 2 of the FAA.
42
 
The discussion then moves to section IV and considers the New York Convention and the 
FAA in light of a number of standard interpretive devices, including the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) and the Charming Betsy canon.
43
  This analysis also 
introduces several more recently developed interpretive methodologies, including the borrowed 
treaty rule and a subject-specific teleological approach, so as to determine which of the various 
interpretive techniques is most appropriate in the arbitral setting.   
Section V concludes the Article by bringing together the diverse strands of argument and 
weighing up the various alternatives.  This section also discusses how the lessons learned in the 
context of international commercial arbitration might assist analysts working in other areas of 
public international law. 
 
II. Setting the Stage  
A. International Commercial Arbitration as Public International Law  
For decades, international commercial arbitration has been considered one of the world’s most 
successful forms of private international law, a conclusion that appears to have led some people 
to overlook arbitration’s public international attributes.44  However, “[b]oth scholars of private 
international law and attorneys for the Department of State have uniformly concluded that there 
                                                          
42
 See 9 U.S.C. §§201-08. 
43
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; 9 U.S.C. §§1-307; Murray v. 
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
44
 See Virginia A. Greiman, The Public/Private Conundrum in International Investment Disputes:  
Advancing Investor Community Partnerships, 32 WHITTIER L. REV. 395, 404 (2011).   
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is no constitutional obstacle to the regulation of private international law through treaty,”45 which 
means that there is no principled reason to exclude international commercial arbitration from the 
kinds of analyses that are common in other areas of public international law simply because the 
New York Convention primarily addresses private rather than public law concerns.
46
 
Indeed, to do so would be contrary to longstanding legal principles.  For example, the 
U.S. Supreme Court recognized over a century ago that international law not only includes  
questions of right between nations, governed by what has been appropriately 
called the “law of nations,” but also questions arising under what is usually called 
“private international law,” or the “conflict of laws,” and concerning the rights of 
persons within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts, private 




Commentators have taken a similar view.  For example, Philip Jessup suggested that the term 
“transnational law” was preferable to “international law,” since the latter did not adequately 
convey the dynamic interaction between public and private international law,
48
 while Harold 
Koh has noted that the law of nations has long been known to “embrac[e] private as well as 
public . . . transactions.”49  Therefore, it is not only appropriate but necessary to apply the 






                                                          
45
 Ku, supra note 15, at 1068. 
46
 See New York Convention, supra note 9.   
47
 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).   
48
 PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956).   
49
 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2351 (1991) 
[hereinafter Koh, Litigation]; see also Ku, supra note 15, at 1063; Zaring, supra note 18, at 704. 
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B. Monism, Dualism and International Commercial Arbitration 
The relationship between international and domestic legal orders has been extensively discussed 
as a matter of international law, constitutional law and institutional design.
50
  One of the most 
standard analytical paradigms involves the concepts of monism and dualism.
51
   
The basic parameters of these two principles are well-known.  Monist states typically do 
not distinguish between international and domestic law, and allow national courts to rely directly 
on international law.
52
  Dualist states, on the other hand, view international and domestic law as 
inherently distinct and require certain actions (typically a legislative act of implementation) 
before international legal principles may be directly relied upon in national courts.
53
  “[M]onism 
and dualism can vary with the type of obligation, meaning that a state can be monist with regard 
to treaty law but dualist with regard to customary international law.”54  
Monists often believe that international law is superior to domestic law, although the 
question of hierarchy is somewhat distinct from the issue of whether international law can 
achieve direct effect within a particular legal order.
55
  Matters of hierarchy and status are decided 
by reference to the constitutional law of the relevant legal system.
56
 
 Although monism and dualism have traditionally played a central role in international 
and constitutional legal theory, some debate nevertheless exists as to the concepts’ scope and 
                                                          
50
 See Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law, 38 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 707, 710 (2006). 
51
 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-34 (7
th
 ed. 2008); Curtis A. 
Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 
530-31 (1999) [hereinafter Bradley, Breard]; Coyle, supra note 3, at 656 & n.1; John H. Jackson, Status 
of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems:  A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 311, 314-15 (1992).   
52
 See BROWNLIE, supra note 51, at 31-34; Bradley, Breard, supra note 51, at 530; Coyle, supra note 3, at 
656 & n.1; Jackson, supra note 51, at 314-15.     
53
 See BROWNLIE, supra note 51, at 31-34; Bradley, Breard, supra note 51, at 530; Coyle, supra note 3, at 
656 & n.1; Jackson, supra note 51, at 314-15.     
54
 Ginsburg, supra note 50, at 714. 
55
 See Bradley, Breard, supra note 51, at 539; Jackson, supra note 51, at 312, 318.   
56
 See Ginsburg, supra note 50, at 713.   
14 
 
continuing vitality.  For example, some commentators claim that “[m]onism is dead,”57 while 
other observers believe that the basic principles of monism live on, either by virtue of a practice 
known as “creeping monism,” wherein common law courts rely on various international treaties 
despite the absence of implementing legislation,
58
 or through the creation of a less extreme 
version of monism.
59
  Other scholars take the view that it is dualism that is outdated and that the 
proper analytical paradigm now involves the distinction between monism and pluralism.
60
 
The United States stands in a somewhat peculiar position with respect to these concepts.  
Because the U.S. Constitution does not indicate whether the country is monist or dualist in 
nature,
61
 U.S. courts must rely on the judicially created concept of “self-executing treaties”62 and 
“non-self-executing treaties” when deciding whether a treaty is directly applicable in the United 
States.
63
  In many ways, the situation is not optimal, since the test relating to self-execution is 
                                                          
57
 Alexander Somek, Monism:  A Tale of the Undead, in CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND BEYOND 343, 344 (Matej Avbelj & Jan Komárek eds., 2012). 
58
 See Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism:  The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of 
Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 633 (2007).   
59
 See Bradley, Breard, supra note 51, at 531; see also Armand de Mestral & Evan Fox-Decent, 
Rethinking the Relationship Between International and Domestic Law, 53 MCGILL L. J. 573, 582 (2008); 
Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 185, 188 
(1993) (noting increased interest in monistic approaches).   
60
 See Neil Walker, Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context, in CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND, supra note 57, at 17, 17-21; see also Jackson, supra note 51, at 
314.   
61
 See Paul R. Dubinsky, International Law in the Legal System of the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 
455, 458 (2010).     
62
 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n.2 (2008); BROWNLIE, supra note 51, at 48; see also David 
L. Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson:  The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties, 53 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 135, 138-39 (2012) [hereinafter Sloss, Two-Step]; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as 
Law of the Land:  The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
599, 667 n.308 (2008) [hereinafter Vázquez, Treaties].   
63
 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314-15 (1829), overruled on other grounds by United States 
v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833); Jackson, supra note 51, at 320; de Mestral & Fox-Decent, 
supra note 59, at 583, 605-06; Moore, Duality, supra note 6, at 2229; Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 





 and is made even more confusing by virtue of the fact that a treaty may 
be self-executing as to some issues or for some purposes but not as to others.
65
  Furthermore, the 
concept of self-execution does not apply to customary international law, thereby creating 
significant questions about custom’s place in the United States’ constitutional order.66  
 Other problems also exist.  For example, although international and constitutional law 
scholars have considered monism and dualism for decades, virtually no one appears to have 
applied these concepts to international commercial arbitration, despite the central role played by 
the New York Convention in the international arbitral regime.
67
  Instead, most references to 
monism and dualism in international commercial arbitration are made only in passing.
68
   
                                                          
64
 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504-32 (2008); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 
376, 388 (4
th
 Cir. 2012); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 
1985); Bradley, Intent, supra note 5, at 540; Sloss, Two-Step, supra note 62, at 135; Carlos Manuel 
Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695 (1995) [hereinafter 
Vázquez, Four Doctrines]; Wu, supra note 63, at 578-79.  
65
 See Dubinsky, supra note 61, at 469; see also Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714, 732 (5th Cir. 2009) (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment), cert. 
denied sub nom. La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s 
London, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010).   
66
 Some commentators believe customary international law is subordinate to federal legislation (since 
customary international law cannot be self-executing), while other experts believe customary international 
law should enjoy the same status as treaties.  See Bradley, Breard, supra note 51, at 549-50; J.H. 
Dalhuisen, Custom and Its Revival in Transnational Private Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 339, 369-
70 (2008); Paulsen, supra note 4, at 1800-04.  Hierarchically speaking, treaties (at least to the extent they 
are self-executing) are considered analogous to federal law and thus superior to inconsistent state law.  
See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2; Bradley, Breard, supra note 51, at 548; Paulsen, supra note 4, at 1774.  
Because treaties hold the same status as federal law, the latter of the two instruments will prevail in cases 
of unavoidable conflict.  See Bradley, Breard, supra note 51, at 549 (describing the “last-in-time” rule); 
Paulsen, supra note 4, at 1776.  However, a treaty that the subject of enabling legislation can also (or 
perhaps can only) rely on the domestic law to establish its primacy over the laws of the individual states.  
See infra notes 79-121 and accompanying text. 
67
 See New York Convention, supra note 9.  
68
 See LEW ET AL., supra note 24, ¶4-45; Amazu A. Asouzu, African States and the Enforcement of 
Arbitral Awards:  Some Key Issues, 15 ARB. INT’L 1, 15 (1999); Radu Bogdan Badhu, Current Status of 
International Arbitration in Romania, 10 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L L. 473, 479 (2008); Mauricio Gomm Ferreira 
Dos Santos, Arbitration in Brazil, 21 J. INT’L ARB. 453, 460 (2004); Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in India: Condition of Reciprocity in INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION AND NATIONAL COURTS: THE NEVER ENDING STORY, X ICCA CONG. SER. 177, 181-82 & 
n.16 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2001).   
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 This is not to say that there has not been extensive discussion about the extent to which 
various countries comply with the principles espoused in the New York Convention, since the 
commentary on that subject is both broad and deep.
69
  However, those analyses typically focus 
on the effect that various domestic statutes, including those based on the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Arbitration Law), have on international 
commercial arbitration.
70
  These statutes are vitally important to the proper operation of the 
international arbitral regime because the New York Convention was not meant to provide a 
comprehensive regulatory framework for international commercial arbitration but was instead 
limited to issues relating to the enforcement of arbitral awards and arbitral agreements.
71
  
Therefore, even those states that are monist in nature need to adopt some sort of statute to fill in 
the various procedural gaps left by the New York Convention.
72
   
Commentary in the United States tends to follow a similar path, focusing on individual 
issues arising under the Convention and the FAA rather than on larger constitutional concerns.
73
  
However, questions about the self-executing nature of the New York Convention have become 
                                                          
69
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; BORN, supra note 9, at 1004-57, 2701-2878; FOUCHARD 
GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 17, ¶¶629-34, 1666-1716; LEW ET AL., supra note 24, ¶¶15-1 to 15-57; 
STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 88-137. 
70
 See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade 
Law, 18th Sess., Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (June 21, 1985), revised by Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n on 
Int’l Trade Law, 39th Sess., June 17-July 7, 2006, Annex I, art. 34, U.N. Doc. A/61/17, U.N. GAOR, 61st 
Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2006) [hereinafter Model Arbitration Law]; BORN, supra note 9, at 115-21; 
FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 17, ¶¶153-205; LEW ET AL., supra note 24, ¶¶2-38 to 2-41.  
The Model Arbitration Law was specifically designed to operate in harmony with the New York 
Convention.  See New York Convention, supra note 9; Model Arbitration Law, supra, Explanatory Note 
to 1985 version, ¶47; BORN, supra note 9, at 115-21; William W. Park, The Specificity of International 
Arbitration:  The Case for FAA Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1241, 1243 (2003).   
71
 See BORN, supra note 9, at 95-96; ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 1958:  
TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 9-10 (1981).   
72
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; Frédéric Bachand, Court Intervention in International 
Arbitration:  The Case for Compulsory Judicial Internationalism, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 83, 89-90. 
73
 See, e.g., New York Convention, supra note 9; 9 U.S.C. §§1-307 (2012); Christopher R. Drahozal, The 
New York Convention and the American Federal System, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 101, 107-14; Strong, 
Writing, supra note 30, at 52-70.   
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increasingly urgent in light of a growing circuit split regarding the arbitrability of international 
insurance disputes.
74
  Although the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on this issue in 2010, 
experts believe that the matter will have to be addressed at some point in the near future, given 
the importance of the international insurance and reinsurance industries to the U.S. economy.
75
   
Questions about the self-executing nature of the New York Convention also arise in other 
contexts, including debates about form requirements
76
 and the FAA’s ability to preempt state 
law.
77
  Although this Article does not turn on matters relating to self-execution, it is nevertheless 
helpful to outline the parameters of the current debate so as to identify the problems U.S. courts 




                                                          
74
 See ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 390-91 (4
th
 Cir. 2012); Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. 
v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. La. 
Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London. 131 S. Ct. 65 
(2010); Suter v. Munich Reins. Co., 223 F.3d 150, 162 (3d Cir. 2000); Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 
F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. SR Int’l Bus. Inc. Co., No. 07-CV-1071, 2007 
WL 2752366, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 20, 2007); Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co. 
I., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of 
London, No. 96-4173-CV-C-2, 1996 WL 938126, at *2 (W.D. Mo. June 10, 1996), appeal dismissed by 
119 F.3d 619 (8
th
 Cir. 1997); In re Arbitration Between England Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n 
(Luxembourg) & Am. Marine Corp., No. 91-3645, 1992 WL 37700, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 1992), 
appeal dismissed, 981 F.2d 749 (5
th
 Cir. 1993).  A flurry of commentary has arisen with respect to this 
issue.  See Cindy Galway Buys & Grant Gorman, Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung and the Scope of 
the President’s Foreign Affairs Power to Preempt Words, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 205, 219 (2012); Goss, 
supra note 8, at 93; Joshua J. Newcomer, International Decision, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 326, 326-32 (2011); 
David A. Rich, Deference to the “Law of Nations:”  The Intersection Between the New York Convention, 
the Convention Act, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and State Anti-Insurance Arbitration Statutes, 33 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 81, 84-86 (2010); Michael J. Ritter, Disputing Arbitration Clauses in International 
Insurance Agreements:  Problems With the Self-Execution Framework, 3 PACE INT’L L. REV. 40, 41 
(2012). 
75
 A recent study places the United States at the top of the international insurance market.  See National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2011 Premium Volume – Worldwide, 
http://www.naic.org/documents/cipr_stats_top_50_worldwide_insurance_markets.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 
2013).  One of the world’s preeminent international insurers/reinsurers, Lloyd’s of London, conducts 
forty-three percent of its business in the United States and Canada.  See Lloyd’s of London, Global 
Reach, http://www.lloyds.com/flash/global-reach/index.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). 
76
 See Strong, Writing, supra note 30, at 52-70; see also supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.   
77
 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 25, at 79-124; Drahozal, supra note 73, at 107-15. 
78
 See New York Convention, supra note 9.   
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C. The Debate About Whether the New York Convention is Self-Executing Under U.S. Law 
At this point, judicial analyses of the self-executing nature of the New York Convention are 
limited and in conflict.
79
  For example, while the U.S. Supreme Court recently suggested, obiter 
dicta, that the Convention is self-executing,
80
 those statements were quite brief and have not 
been relied upon by the lower courts.
81
   
 Lower federal courts have typically avoided the issue of self-execution.
82
  However, the 
matter has become increasingly difficult to ignore, given the need to consider reverse preemption 
in the context of international insurance disputes.   
The term “reverse preemption” describes situations in which Congress defers to state 
authority, thereby allowing state law to trump (i.e., reverse preempt) federal law.
83
  The phrase is 
used most often in the context of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which is said to authorize reverse 
                                                          
79
 See New York Convention, supra note 9. 
80
 The Court noted in the seminal case of Medellin v. Texas that 
 
Congress is up to the task of implementing non-self-executing treaties, even those 
involving complex commercial disputes. . . . The judgments of a number of international 
tribunals enjoy a different status because of implementing legislation enacted by 
Congress.  See, e.g., . . . 9 U.S.C. §§201-208 (“The [U.N.] Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be 
enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter,” §201).  Such language 
demonstrates that Congress knows how to accord domestic effect to international 
obligations when it desires such a result. 
 
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521-22 (2009); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 
520 n.15 (1974).   
81
 See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714, 722 (5th Cir. 
2009), cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters 
at Lloyd’s London, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010).   
82
 See ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 388 (4
th
 Cir. 2012); Lobo v. Celebrity Cruises, 
Inc. 426 F. Supp. 2d 1296,  1301 (S.D. Fla. 2006), aff’d, 488 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2007); Chloe Z Fishing 
Co. v. Odyssey Re (London) Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1252-53 (S.D. Cal. 2000); In re Fotochrome, 
377 F. Supp. 26, 30-31 (D.C.N.Y. 1974). 
83
 See Anita Bernstein, Implied Reverse Preemption, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 669, 673 n.29 (2009).   
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preemption of the FAA in cases where state law bars arbitration of insurance disputes.
84
  While 
reverse preemption is uncontroversial in domestic disputes falling entirely under Chapter 1 of the 
FAA, difficulties arise in international matters due to questions involving the nature of the New 
York Convention and the relationship between the Convention and Chapter 2 of the FAA.
85
 
At this point, the two opposing positions are most cogently described by the Second 
Circuit in Stephens v. American International Insurance Co.
86
 and the Fifth Circuit in Safety 
National Casualty Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London.87  Although the Third and 
Fourth Circuits have also weighed in on this issue and have both concluded that the FAA and 
New York Convention are not reverse preempted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
88
 these 
opinions are less relevant to the current discussion, since the Third Circuit analysis focuses 
largely on issues relating to foreign sovereign immunity
89
 and the Fourth Circuit ultimately 
decided the dispute as a matter of statutory, rather than treaty, interpretation.
90
  Those district 
courts that have considered the issue appear to agree that reverse preemption does not occur in 
cases falling under the Convention.
91
   
                                                          
84
 See 9 U.S.C. §§1-307 (2012); 15 U.S.C. §1012(b) (2012) (“No Act of Congress shall be construed to 
invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of 
insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.”); Bernstein, supra note 83, 
at 673 n.29.   
85
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; 9 U.S.C. §§201-08.   
86
 See Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995). 
87
 See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009), 
cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s London, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010).    
88
 See ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 390-91 (4
th
 Cir. 2012); Suter v. Munich Reins. 
Co., 223 F.3d 150, 162 (3d Cir. 2000).   
89
 See Suter, 223 F.3d at 162.   
90
 See ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 388; see also 15 U.S.C. §1012(b).       
91
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. SR Int’l Bus. Inc. Co., No. 07-CV-
1071, 2007 WL 2752366, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 20, 2007); Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth 
Settlement Co. I., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters 
at Lloyd’s of London, No. 96-4173-CV-C-2, 1996 WL 938126, at *2 (W.D. Mo. June 10, 1996), appeal 
dismissed by 119 F.3d 619 (8
th
 Cir. 1997); In re Arbitration Between Engl. Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n 
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The Second Circuit was the first appellate court to discuss reverse preemption under the 
New York Convention and conducted a brief and somewhat superficial analysis in Stephens that 
some authorities believe was quickly called into question by another panel sitting in the same 
circuit.
92
  The decision in Stephens turned largely on the court’s characterization of Chapter 2 of 
the FAA as implementing legislation necessary to give effect to the Convention.
93
  As a result, 
the Second Circuit concluded that the New York Convention was not self-executing and was 
therefore “inapplicable” in the circumstances at bar.94   
In its discussion, the court relied entirely on Foster v. Nielson for the definition of a self-
executing treaty, stating that  
[o]ur constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land.  It is, consequently, to 
be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever 
it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision.  But when the 
terms of the stipulation import a contract – when either of the parties engage to 
perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial 
department; and the legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a 




The emphasis placed on Foster v. Nielson is entirely understandable, given that Stephens 
was handed down in 1995, long before the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence on self-
executing treaties.
96
  However, other courts – including the Fifth Circuit – have found the 
analysis in Stephens not only dated but unhelpfully terse and conclusory.
97
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Luxembourg) & Am. Marine Corp., No. 91-3645, 1992 WL 37700, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 1992), 
appeal dismissed, 981 F.2d 749 (5
th
 Cir. 1993). 
92
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995); see 
also ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 390-91. 
93
 See 9 U.S.C. §§201-08 (2012); Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45; see also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 
313-14 (1829), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833); 
94
 Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45.   
95
 Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 313-14, as quoted in Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45. 
96
 See Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45; Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 313-14; see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 
491, 521-22 (2009); Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2868-71 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Noriega v. 
Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002, 1002-10 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 436-37 (2006); Medellin v. Drake, 544 U.S. 660, 685-90 (2005) 
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When the Fifth Circuit took on the issue in 2009, it conducted a much more robust and 
detailed discussion of the New York Convention, the McCarran-Ferguson Act and Chapter 2 of 
the FAA.
98
  For example, the court not only considered the mandatory nature of the Convention, 
it also noted the purpose of Chapter 2 of the FAA in giving effect to the Convention.
99
  In so 
doing, the Fifth Circuit was guided in part by the pro-arbitration policy enunciated in both the 
New York Convention and Supreme Court precedent.
100
  However, the Fifth Circuit also noted 
that Chapter 2 of the FAA serves a variety of purposes, including the creation of federal 
jurisdiction and the identification of an appropriate venue.
101
  These statements suggest a 
recognition by the court that the New York Convention requires some sort of supplementary 
legislation to address certain background procedural matters.
102
  Indeed, similar types of 
legislation have been adopted even in monist states that do not need to use domestic enactments 
to give direct effect to a treaty, suggesting that Chapter 2 of the FAA does not necessarily have 
to be considered a form of implementing legislation in the traditional sense.
103
 
The Fifth Circuit took a very interesting view of the relationship between a treaty and its 
implementing legislation in U.S. law, stating that 
[e]ven if the [New York] Convention required legislation to implement some or 
all of its provisions in United States courts, that does not mean that Congress 
intended an “Act of Congress,” as that phrase is used in the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, to encompass a non-self-executing treaty that has been implemented by 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728, 735 (2004); Torres v. Mullin, 
540 U.S. 1035, 1035 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).  
97
 See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 722; id. at 737 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
98
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; 9 U.S.C. §§1-208; 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012); Safety Nat’l, 
587 F.3d at 717.  
99
 See New York Convention, supra note 9, art. II(1); 9 U.S.C. §201; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 719, 722, 
725.  
100
 See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 730; see also New York Convention, supra note 9; Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638-39 (1985).   
101
 See 9 U.S.C. §§203-04; see Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 719, 722.   
102
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 719, 722. 
103
 See 9 U.S.C. §§201-08; see also supra note 72 and infra note 316 and accompanying text. 
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congressional legislation.  Implementing legislation that does not conflict with or 
override a treaty does not replace or displace that treaty.  A treaty remains an 
international agreement or contract negotiated by the Executive Branch and 
ratified by the Senate, not by Congress.  The fact that a treaty is implemented by 
Congress does not mean that it ceases to be a treaty and becomes an “Act of 
Congress.”104 
 
As a result, some authorities have characterized the opinion as indicating “that the provisions of 
a non-self-executing, implemented treaty ‘have full preemptive effect’” in the United States.105  
In arriving at this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the fact that Chapter 2 of 
the FAA invokes rights arising out of the Convention, which can be seen as directing the court to 
the Convention itself.
106
  Furthermore,   
[w]hen Congress amended the FAA in 1970 to include provisions that dealt with 
the Convention, it provided in 9 U.S.C. §203, that “[a]n action or proceeding 
falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties 
of the United States.”  This is a direct indication that Congress thought that for 
jurisdictional purposes, an action falling under the Convention arose not only 




                                                          
104
 Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 722-23 (footnotes omitted).  Similar conclusions have been reached in other 
contexts.  See Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 902-03 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat. Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140, 1145 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also 
Prokopeva v. Carnival Corp., No. C-08-213, 2008 WL 4276975, at *3 n.8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2008); 
Matter of Arbitration Between England Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n (Luxembourg) and Am. Marine 
Corp., Nos. 91-3645, 91-3798, 1992 WL 37700, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 1992), appeal dismissed, 981 
F.2d 749 (5
th
 Cir. 1993).  Some courts go even further.  See Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, 
Inc., 969 F.3d 953, 958 (10
th
 Cir. 1992) (noting “ratification of the Convention makes it part of the 
supreme law of the land, as enforceable as Congressional enactments”); Clow v. Ins. Corp. of British 
Columbia, No. 07-403-ST, 2007 WL 2292689, at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 6, 2007); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. R&S 
Co., 176 F. Supp. 2d 935, 938 (D. Minn. 2001); Filanto, S.p.A., v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 
1229, 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dismissed by 984 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.1993) (though also noting a role 
for the FAA).   
105
 See ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 387 (4
th
 Cir. 2012) (quoting Safety Nat’l, 587 
F.3d at 733 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment)). 
106
 See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 724-25, 727-28; see also New York Convention, supra note 9; 9 U.S.C. 
§§201-08. 
107
 Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 724; see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 430-32 (1920). 
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These factors led a majority of the Fifth Circuit to conclude that courts are empowered under 
Chapter 2 of the FAA to rely directly on the language of the New York Convention.
108
   
Although the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the self-executing nature of the New York 
Convention is quite detailed, the court did not ultimately decide the case on those grounds.
109
  
Instead, Safety National appears to turn on the court’s conclusion that the “commonly understood 
meaning of an ‘Act of Congress’ does not include a ‘treaty,’ even if the treaty required 
implementing legislation,” and that the McCarran-Ferguson Act therefore does not apply in cases 
falling under the Convention.
110
  Nevertheless, the analysis reflected in this case is quite 
instructive. 
In addition to the majority holding, Safety National generated both concurring and 
dissenting opinions.
111
  The concurring opinion by Circuit Judge Clement suggested that the New 
York Convention should be considered self-executing, at least with respect to Article II, which 
concerns form requirements as well as the mandatory duty to compel arbitration in cases falling 
under the Convention.
112
  In arriving at this conclusion, Circuit Judge Clement focused on the 
way in which Article II(3) of the Convention speaks directly to the courts of a state party, rather 
than the state party itself.
113
   
Because the concurrence in Safety National directly addressed the issue of self-execution, 
Circuit Judge Clement was forced to address problematic dicta from the U.S. Supreme Court 
                                                          
108
 See 9 U.S.C. §§201-08; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 724-25, 727-28; see also id. at 734 (Clement, C.J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
109
 See New York Convention, supra note 9. 
110
 Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 723; see also 15 U.S.C. §1012(b) (2012). 
111
 See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 732 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 737 (Elrod, J., 
dissenting). 
112
 See New York Convention, supra note 9, art. II; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 733-34 (Clement, C.J., 
concurring the judgment).    
113
 See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 736-37 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
24 
 
suggesting that the New York Convention is non-self-executing.
114
  Circuit Judge Clement 
overcame that obstacle by concluding that the Supreme Court was referring to Article III, rather 
than Article II, of the Convention.
115
  While this approach may have its supporters, scholars have 
noted the incongruity of giving different effects to different parts of a single legal instrument.
116
 
Safety National also included a dissenting opinion that concluded that the New York 
Convention, as a non-self-executing treaty, had no place in the national legal order.
117
  Instead, 
the three dissenting judges believed that “only the implementing legislation [i.e., Chapter 2 of the 
FAA] had preemptive effect.”118  Because Chapter 2 constitutes an “act of Congress,” it falls 
within the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act and can be reverse preempted.
119
   
The opinions in Stephens and Safety National address a range of issues and demonstrate a 
variety of perspectives concerning the relationship between the New York Convention and the 
FAA.
120
  However, one item that is missing from both discussions as well as the associated 
commentary is serious consideration of the “difficult constitutional question” that arises when a 
particular issue is governed by both a treaty and a statute that is meant to incorporate that treaty 
into domestic law.
121
  This is an area of significant practical and theoretical concern in 
                                                          
114
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521-22 (2009); Safety 
Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 736-37 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
115
 See New York Convention, supra note 9, arts. II-III; Medellin, 552 U.S. at 521-22; Safety Nat’l, 587 
F.3d at 736-37 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment).  
116
 See RUTLEDGE, supra note 25, at 108. 
117
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; Safety Nat’l., 587 F.3d at 748 (Elrod, C.J., dissenting). 
118
 Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 748 (Elrod, C.J., dissenting); see also New York Convention, supra note 9; 9 
U.S.C. §§201-08 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012). 
119
 Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 752 (Elrod, C.J., dissenting); see also New York Convention, supra note 9; 9 
U.S.C. §§201-08; 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). 
120
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; 9 U.S.C. §§1-307; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 714; Stephens v. 
Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995). 
121
 Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 732-33 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
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international commercial arbitration (as well as in other fields) and requires clear analysis if 
courts are to interpret and apply the New York Convention properly.
122
   
 
III. Interpreting Treaties Relating to International Commercial Arbitration  
A. Interpreting and Implementing the New York Convention as a Matter of Theory 
Although contemporary commentary often overlooks the public international law attributes of 
international commercial arbitration, several international authorities have nevertheless indicated 
that the New York Convention should be interpreted “in accordance with the rules of 
interpretation of international law, which are codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.”123  Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides the 
general rules of interpretation and indicates that   
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose.  
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:  
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;  
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty.  
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;  
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties.  
                                                          
122
 See New York Convention, supra note 9. 
123
 INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, ICCA’S GUIDE TO THE INTERPRETATION 
OF THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION 12 (2011) [hereinafter ICCA GUIDE]; see also Vienna Convention, 
supra note 43, arts. 31-32; VAN DEN BERG, supra note 71, at 3-5; Bachand, supra note 72, at 95; Toby 
Landau, The Requirement of A Written Form for An Arbitration Agreement: When “Written” Means 
“Oral,” in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:  IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS, XI 
ICCA CONG. SER. 19, 74-79 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2003).   
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Article 32 provides supplementary rules of interpretation and indicates that 
[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine 
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:  
 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  




The emphasis placed by international commentators on the Vienna Convention could 
give rise to some difficulties in the United States, since the U.S. has signed but not yet ratified 
that instrument.
126
  However, the Vienna Convention has been relied upon by several members 
of the U.S. Supreme Court and various lower federal courts in contexts other than international 
commercial arbitration.
127
  Indeed, some circuits consider the Vienna Convention “‘an 
authoritative guide to the customary international law of treaties,’ insofar as it reflects actual 
state practices.”128  Furthermore, “[t]he Department of State considers the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties an authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice.”129  Therefore, 
reliance on the interpretive principles outlined in the Vienna Convention would appear to be 
appropriate in the United States.
130
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 Vienna Convention, supra note 43, art. 31.   
125
 Id. art. 32. 
126
 See id.; Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1362 (2d Cir. 1992), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). 
127
 The rationale for reliance differs from case to case.  See, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 2007 
n.11 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 391 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); Sale, 509 U.S. at 191 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 950 
n.15 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1983; Sanchez Chubb & Son, 
Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 2000); Haitian Centers Council, 969 F.2d at 1362.   
128
 Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 196 n.19 (2d Cir. 2008).   
129
 Id.   
130
 See Vienna Convention, supra note 43, arts. 31-32. 
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Some problems could arise as a result of the Vienna Convention’s non-retroactivity 
clause, since the New York Convention was opened for signature more than a decade prior to the 
Vienna Convention’s opening date.131  However, the United States acceded to the New York 
Convention on September 30, 1970, several months after the United States signed the Vienna 
Convention, which suggests that the retroactivity clause should not apply in cases involving 
international commercial arbitration.
132
   
Ultimately, it may not matter whether the Vienna Convention formally applies to disputes 
involving the New York Convention, since numerous commentators have concluded that the 
interpretive approach reflected in “the Vienna Convention does not differ greatly from U.S. 
practice.”133  Indeed, these similarities can be seen in at least one case involving international 
commercial arbitration.
134
  Furthermore, the rising influence of textualism in the United States 
may minimize any methodological differences that currently exist,
135
 since the primary 
distinction between the U.S. approach and the Vienna Convention appears to be that “U.S. courts 
have consulted extratextual sources a bit more readily than the convention suggests.”136   
 
                                                          
131
 See id. art. 4; see also New York Convention, supra note 9.     
132
 See Vienna Convention, supra note 43, art. 4.   
133
 Glashausser, supra note 6, at 1262.  Most interpretive canons used in the United States require 
construction of a treaty in a manner consistent with its “text, intent, and purpose,” which many observers 
believe would yield an outcome similar to that under the Vienna Convention.  David J. Bederman, 
Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 953, 957 (1994); see also Vienna 
Convention, supra note 43, arts. 31-32; David S. Jonas & Thomas N. Saunders, The Object and Purpose 
of a Treaty:  Three Interpretive Methods, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 565, 575-80 (2010).   
134
 See Kahn Lucas Lancaster Inc. v. Lark Int’l Inc., 186 F.3d 210, 216-18 (2d Cir. 1999), partially 
abrogated on other grounds by Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657 (2d Cir. 2005). 
135
 At this point, Supreme Court jurisprudence appears somewhat split as to the degree to which textual 
analyses prevail and the level of clarity that must be exhibited in the text of a treaty.  See Abbott v. 
Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1990, 1993-95 (2010); Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506-12 (2008); see also 
id. at 540-42 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Dubinsky, supra note 61, at 461, 471.   
136
 Glashausser, supra note 6, at 1262; see also Dubinsky, supra note 61, at 461, 470-72; David Sloss, 
Non-Self-Executing Treaties:  Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 4 (2002) 
[hereinafter Sloss, Constitutional].  But see Jonas & Saunders, supra note 133, at 578.   
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B. Interpreting and Implementing the New York Convention as a Matter of Practice 
The philosophical distinction between “ought” and “is” suggests that it is not enough to identify 
how the New York Convention should be construed.
137
  Instead, it is necessary to consider how 
the Convention actually is interpreted and applied in practice.
138
  Such analyses are particularly 
important because the Vienna Convention indicates that the parties’ subsequent agreements and 
practices are to be taken into account as an interpretive tool.
139
  Commentators have also noted 
the propriety of a “dynamic” form of interpretation in cases involving commercial treaties.140 
Interestingly, international commercial arbitration stands in a somewhat privileged 
position with respect to questions of subsequent practice, since a variety of public and private 
institutions have been compiling data on the interpretation and application of the New York 
Convention for over fifty years, thereby making comparative analysis easy for both courts and 
commentators.
141
  The large and increasing number of arbitration-related disputes in U.S. courts 
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 See New York Convention, supra note 9; see also DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 
(1739). 
138
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; ICCA GUIDE, supra note 123, at 12.   
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 See Vienna Convention, supra note 43, art. 31(3).  
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 Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 692 (1998).  But see 
Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 135 (1989). 
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 See, e.g., UNCITRAL, Working Grp. II (Arbitration), Preparation of Uniform Provisions on Written 
Form for Arbitration Agreements, Note by the Secretariat, ¶¶11-23, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.139 
(Dec. 14, 2005) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Note]; ICCA GUIDE, supra note 123; VAN DEN BERG, supra 
note 71; Edward S. Cohen, Normative Modeling for Global Economic Governance:  The Case of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 574, 574-
96 (2011); Pieter Sanders, Foreword, in ICCA GUIDE, supra note 123, at v, vi. 
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 See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:  Methodological 
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1753-60 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, 
Laboratories]; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
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1. The UNCITRAL survey  
One of the most useful studies in this area of law involves a survey conducted by UNCITRAL on 
the implementation of the New York Convention worldwide.
143
  The project, which was 
completed in 2008, generated responses from 108 of the then-142 states parties to the New York 
Convention and found that: 
[f]or a vast majority of States, the New York Convention was considered as “self-
executing”, “directly applicable” and becoming a party to it put the Convention 
and all of its obligations in action.  Most of those States mentioned that, in 
accordance with their Constitution, conventions “enjoy a hierarchy above laws”, 
“form an integral part of domestic law and prevail over any contrary provision of 
the law”, or that “they have force of law after their conclusion, ratification and 
publication according to the established procedures.”144 
 
Thus, most states appear to have adopted a monist approach to the New York 
Convention.
145
  However, monism simply describes the way in which a legal system integrates 
international law into its domestic realm as a matter of constitutional law.
146
  Questions still 
remain as to how a particular treaty is interpreted by national courts.
147
  
According to UNCITRAL, “[a] significant number of responses emphasized the fact that 
the Convention should be interpreted according to articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, either in combination with other rules of interpretation, or as 
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 See UNCITRAL, Secretariat, The Report on the Survey Relating to the Legislative Implementation of 
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.9/656 (June 5, 2008) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Survey Report], available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/sessions/41st.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2012). 
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 UNCITRAL Survey Report, supra note 143, ¶10; see also id. ¶6.   
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 See New York Convention, supra note 9; see also Ferreira Dos Santos, supra note 68, at 460; de 
Mestral & Fox-Decent, supra note 59, at 606-07; Jackson, supra note 51, at 320; Rao, supra note 68, at 
181-82 & n.16; Jian Zhou, Judicial Intervention in International Arbitration:  A Comparative Study of the 
Scope of the New York Convention in U.S. and Chinese Courts, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 403, 453 
(2006). 
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 See BROWNLIE, supra note 51, at 31-34; Ginsburg, supra note 50, at 713-14; Jackson, supra note 51, 
at 311.   
147
 See UNCITRAL Survey Report, supra note 143, ¶¶34-40.     
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the sole source of interpretation.”148  However, the report also noted that “[u]pon ratifying or 
acceding to the [New York] Convention, several States made a declaration that the Convention 
was to be interpreted in accordance with the principles of their Constitution,” a practice that 
could diminish the scope and effectiveness of the New York Convention.
149
 
The UNCITRAL report also noted that, in addition to various constitutional canons, 
states relied on judicial precedent or advice from a particular ministerial or governmental office 
when interpreting the New York Convention.
150
  Furthermore, some states indicated that they 
could or would rely on the New York Convention’s travaux préparatoires.151  Though 
appropriate as a matter of constitutional law, this type of interpretive diversity is potentially 
problematic in an area of law where international consistency and predictability is paramount. 
Although a majority of the states surveyed by UNCITRAL appear to have adopted a 
monist approach to the New York Convention, a number of states indicated that they gave 
domestic effect to the Convention on a dualist basis.
152
  This information was unsurprising, since 
commentators had long recognized the need for some states to provide for domestic application 
of the New York Convention through implementing legislation.
153
  However, the UNCITRAL 
study reinforced some of the dangers of dualism by noting that in these jurisdictions, the 
Convention could be deemed to have no legal significance as a matter of national law.
154
  
UNCITRAL also noted that various states “mentioned that distinct rules of interpretation 
were used depending on the instrument to be interpreted, i.e., the Convention or the 
                                                          
148
 Id. ¶36; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 43, arts. 31-32. 
149
 UNCITRAL Survey Report, supra note 143, ¶36; see also New York Convention, supra note 9; 
Vienna Convention, supra note 43, arts. 18, 31-32.   
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 See UNCITRAL Survey Report, supra note 143, ¶¶36-37; see also New York Convention, supra note 
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 See Vienna Convention, supra note 43, art. 32; UNCITRAL Survey Report, supra note 143, ¶38.   
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 See ICCA GUIDE, supra note 123, at 28; BORN, supra note 9, at 100.   
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 See UNCITRAL Survey Report, supra note 143, ¶11.   
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implementing legislation.”155  Furthermore, the method of incorporation varied significantly, 
with some legal systems using “an ‘Arbitration Act, to which the Convention [was] attached as a 
schedule,’” while other jurisdictions used “‘the enactment of a special act on Foreign Arbitral 
Awards’, or the ‘enactment of a legislative decree.’”156  Still other countries amended their laws 
so as to give effect to the Convention.
157
    
The report went on to identify the types of practical problems that can arise in a dualist 
legal system.  For example, UNCITRAL noted that “[c]hanges of varying scope might have been 
introduced in the implementing legislation.”158  These potential variations included “changes of 
substance, additions, or omissions”159 as well as “only a partial adoption of the Convention.”160  
UNCITRAL identified additional problems in states that allow the text of implementing 
legislation to prevail over the treaty itself as a matter of constitutional law.
161
   
Although the UNCITRAL survey focused solely on matters relating to the New York 
Convention, the report provides useful empirical data for comparative constitutional lawyers, 
since the information provided by the 108 state respondents confirms the ways in which 
implementing legislation can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
162
  Furthermore, the 
UNCITRAL survey notes the diversity of interpretive methods used in treaty-related disputes, a 
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 Id. ¶12. 
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2. The Federal Arbitration Act   
Federalist legal systems such as the United States expect a number of permissible variations to 
arise in the way in which certain laws are interpreted and applied in the domestic setting.
164
  
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]n our dealings with the outside world 
the United States speaks with one voice and acts as one, unembarrassed by the complications as 
to domestic issues which are inherent in the distribution of political power between the national 
government and the individual states.”165   
 The need for predictability and consistency is particularly high in cases involving 
international commercial arbitration, since commercial actors around the world need to be able to 
anticipate how a particular issue will be resolved by national courts.
166
  Thus, the U.S. Supreme 
Court famously stated in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., that 
concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and 
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial 
system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the 
parties’ [arbitration] agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be 




Indeed, “[i]f the United States is to be able to gain the benefits of international accords and have 
a role as a trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, its courts should be most cautious before 
interpreting its domestic legislation in such manner as to violate international agreements.”168   
Specialists in international commercial arbitration have conducted a considerable amount 
of research into the way in which U.S. courts interpret and apply the New York Convention, but 
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 See Gluck, Laboratories, supra note 142, at 1753-60.  This phenomenon has been seen in the area of 
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 U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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 See BORN, supra note 9, at 75. 
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most of those studies have focused on specific issues within the field.
169
  Thus, for example, one 
line of analysis attempts to either reconcile or reject the use of manifest disregard of law as a 
means of vacating an arbitral award in disputes falling under the New York Convention
170
 while 
other research efforts focus on the interaction between the form requirements contained in the 
New York Convention and those reflected in the FAA.
171
  Debates also rage about the extent to 
which anti-suit injunctions
172
 and U.S. “gateway” analyses are consistent with the New York 
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a doctrine which, although brandished as a threat to the validity of New York Convention arbitration 
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supra note 9, at 580-81; VAN DEN BERG, supra note 71, at 387-89; Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez, Article 
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CONVENTION, IX ICCA CONG. SER. 67, 68-82 (1999) [hereinafter Alvarez, Article II(2)]; Phillipp A. 
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  Circuit splits exist with respect to a number of these issues,
174
 and certiorari has 
been sought from the Supreme Court on various occasions.
175
 
As useful as these subject-specific discussions are, they fail to address more systemic 
issues relating to the relationship between the New York Convention and the FAA.
176
  Those 
matters, which can be framed as either textual or conceptual in nature, demonstrate a number of 
concerns that arise as a matter of both international and constitutional law.  
 
a. Textual issues 
When analyzing the relationship between the New York Convention and the FAA, the first 
matter to consider involves the text of the two instruments.
177
  Section 201 of the FAA indicates 
that “[t]he Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 
10, 1958, shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter.”178  This 
statutory formulation appears to be nearly unique in U.S. law, for although other federal statutes 
occasionally use the term “in accordance with this chapter” or similar language, the FAA’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Injunctions in Support of International Arbitration: Five Questions American Courts Ask, 28 J. INT’L 
ARB. 21 (2011); Reisman & Iravani, supra note 17, at 30-36; Strong, Borders, supra note 12, at 12. 
173
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777-
79 (2010); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-84 (2002); First Options of Chicago, 
Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995); BORN, supra note 9, at 1020-48, 2028-66; LEW ET AL., supra 
note 24, ¶¶15-1 to 15-57; George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International Commercial 
Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2012); S.I. Strong, Navigating the Borders Between International 
Commercial Arbitration and U.S. Federal Courts:  A Jurisprudential GPS, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 
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Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657, 660 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005); Sphere Drake Ins. plc v. Marine 
Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666 (5
th
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175
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176
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incorporative framework is entirely different from those other examples.
179
  Therefore, it appears 
impossible to construe this term using any interpretive canons relating to the use of the same or 
similar terms in different contexts.
180
   
Furthermore, it is unclear from the face of Section 201 whether Chapter 2 is intended to 
supplement, diminish or amend the terms of the New York Convention in any way.
181
  On the 
one hand, Section 201’s reference to other parts of Chapter 2 could simply reflect a recognition 
that the New York Convention neither intends to nor in fact does address all matters relating to 
international arbitration, and that states need to enact supplementary legislation to create an 
adequate regulatory framework in which the Convention can operate.
182
  On the other hand, the 




Close consideration of the other aspects of the statute yield potentially contradictory 
results.  For example, a number of items discussed in Chapter 2 of the FAA have no analogue in 
the New York Convention and therefore cannot be said to affect the interpretation or application 
of the treaty in U.S. courts.
184
  These provisions, which relate to federal jurisdiction, venue, 
removal, compelling arbitration, naming of arbitrators and confirming the award, are consistent 
with the type of background procedural matters that are contained in arbitration statutes enacted 
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other jurisdictions, including statutes adopted in states that reflect a monist approach to 
international treaties.
185
   
The final provision of Chapter 2 of the FAA, Section 208, also suggests that Chapter 2 is 
not meant to alter the terms of the Convention.
186
  This section states that “Chapter 1 [of the 
FAA] applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chapter [i.e., Chapter 2] to the extent 
that chapter is not in conflict with this chapter or the Convention as ratified by the United 
States.”187  While this provision may initially appear to constitute nothing more than a gap-filling 
mechanism similar to that found in Sections 203 to 207 of the FAA, the express limitation 
embodied in Section 208 (i.e., that the incorporation of Chapter 1 cannot be conducted in a way 
that is inconsistent with the Convention) can be used to demonstrate a congressional 
disinclination to alter the terms of the treaty.
188
 
However, there is one aspect of the statute that could be read to alter the United States’ 
obligations under the New York Convention.
189
  Section 202 of the FAA discusses form 
requirements, a subject that is also covered under Article II of the New York Convention, and 
does so in a way that could be seen as inconsistent with the language of the Convention.
190
   
Section 202 states that “[a]n arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal 
relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a 
transaction, contract, or agreement described in section 2 of this title, falls under the [New York] 
Convention.”191  Unfortunately, section 2 (which is found in Chapter 1) of the FAA predates the 
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New York Convention and therefore does not mirror the language found in the Convention.
192
  
For example, while section 2 of the FAA only needs evidence of a “written provision” or “an 
agreement in writing,” the New York Convention requires either “an arbitral clause in a contract 
or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or 
telegrams.”193   
Difficulties relating to the interpretation and application of Section 202 of the FAA and 
Article II of the Convention have generated a longstanding circuit split
194
 that is distinguishable 
from the burgeoning debate about whether the New York Convention, and particularly Article II, 
is self-executing as a matter of U.S. law.
195
  However, both situations are exacerbated by judicial 
opinions suggesting that Article II of the Convention is the only section (or perhaps one of the 
only sections) of the treaty that is self-executing.
196
   
This Article will not attempt to resolve these particular issues, since they are beyond the 
scope of the current discussion.  However, it would appear logical to extend the admonition 
contained in Section 208 (i.e., that no aspect of Chapter 1 that was inconsistent with the 
Convention should be relied upon in cases falling under Chapter 2) to issues arising under 
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  This reading would conform with the overall text of Chapter 2 as well as the 
notion that Congress should not be assumed to legislate in contravention to the United States’ 
international obligations, absent evidence to the contrary.
198
   
    
b. Conceptual issues 
Although textual analyses give rise to their own set of problems, the more striking issues arise as 
a conceptual matter.  Indeed, as one commentator recently noted, “[i]t is now 40 years since the 
United States became a party to the [New York] Convention, and there is still an absence of 
consensus on the application of the Convention” in U.S. law, at least in some regards.199   
Perhaps the most significant difficulty facing U.S. courts is a widespread confusion about 
the circumstances in which the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the FAA apply.
200
  The 
issue here involves the distinction in the Convention between “arbitral awards made in the 
territory of a State other than the State where recognition and enforcement of such awards are 
sought” (i.e., “foreign” arbitral awards) and “arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards 
in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought” (i.e., “non-domestic” 
awards).
201
   
 Although most states parties to the New York Convention only recognize the 
Convention’s applicability to foreign arbitral awards, Article I(1) of the Convention specifically 
allows states to determine whether to extend the protections of the Convention to both foreign 
                                                          
197
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  The United States has explicitly agreed to do so pursuant to 
Sections 2 and 202 of the FAA, which state that Chapter 2 of the FAA applies to agreements and 
awards relating to foreign arbitrations (i.e., arbitrations that are or were seated outside of the 
United States) and also to arbitrations that are or were seated within the United States and that 
arise 
(1) between a U.S. and foreign party; 
(2) entirely between foreign parties; or 




Even though these latter types of proceedings are seated within the United States, they 
are considered non-domestic as a matter of U.S. law and therefore fall under the New York 
Convention pursuant to the second sentence of Article I(1).
204
  The problem is that although the 
statutory scheme is quite clear (albeit slightly convoluted), a number of U.S. courts continue to 
insist erroneously “that Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act . . . still has an independent and 
decisive role to play in determining the legal effectiveness of an international award subject to 
the New York Convention of 1958, if that award is rendered in the United States.”205  Not only 




Issues relating to non-domestic awards and agreements are not the only type of 
conceptual difficulties that can arise in international commercial arbitration.  Additional 
problems exist with respect to the way in which the FAA interacts with underlying principles of 
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  The issue here involves various requirements relating to personal and subject-
matter jurisdiction in U.S. federal courts.
208
   
The first set of difficulties relates to the need for parties to establish federal  jurisdiction 
over either the person or the property in question by relying on either (1) the appropriate 
constitutional test (such as those relating to general or specific personal jurisdiction
209
 or in rem 
or quasi-in rem jurisdiction
210
) or (2) principles set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.
211
  However, because these requirements do not exist in the New York Convention, 
they can be seen as constituting an additional, and often invisible, hurdle for parties to overcome 
in cases brought in U.S. courts.
212
   
This issue reflects a potential conflict between international and constitutional law.  In 
one line of cases, courts have given primacy to the constitutional tests for jurisdiction by relying 
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on longstanding principles regarding the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution over treaties
213
 and 
on Article III of the New York Convention, which allows courts to enforce arbitral awards “in 
accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon.”214  
However, the presumptive superiority of U.S. domestic law is less defensible when jurisdiction is 
based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, since statutes carry the same constitutional weight 
as treaties.
215
  In those instances, the better solution might be to give full effect to claims made 
by various commentators that Article III of the Convention was never meant to constitute an 
additional grounds upon which to deny enforcement of an arbitral award or agreement.
216
   
Issues also arise with respect to federal subject-matter jurisdiction, even though Chapter 2 
of the FAA establishes an independent basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction in disputes 
arising under the New York Convention.
217
  The problem here can be traced back to the failure 
of some courts to recognize the applicability of Chapter 2 of the FAA to disputes involving non-
domestic agreements or awards.
218
  Because Chapter 1 of the FAA does not provide for federal 
subject-matter jurisdiction, a court operating under the mistaken impression that Chapter 2 does 
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not apply might ask the parties to establish subject-matter jurisdiction through some other means, 
such as the existence of a federal question or diversity of the parties.
219
  Although it might appear 
that it would be easy to establish the requisite facts, that is not always the case.
220
 
Problems with either personal or subject matter jurisdiction could result in the dispute’s 
being dismissed from federal court.  While the matter could be reasserted in U.S. state court, that 
raises the question of whether the denial of federal jurisdiction in matters relating to international 
commercial arbitration constitutes a breach of international law.
221
  To answer that question, it is 
necessary to determine whether and to what extent the New York Convention applies in U.S. 
state court as a matter of both U.S. and international law.
222
 
The New York Convention considers matters of federal-state competence in Article XI, 
which states: 
In the case of a federal or non-unitary State, the following provisions shall apply: 
 
(a) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the 
legislative jurisdiction of the federal authority, the obligations of the federal 
Government shall to this extent be the same as those of Contracting States which 
are not federal States; 
 
(b) With respect to those articles of this Convention that come within the 
legislative jurisdiction of constituent states or provinces which are not, under the 
constitutional system of the federation, bound to take legislative action, the 
federal Government shall bring such articles with a favourable recommendation to 
the notice of the appropriate authorities of constituent states or provinces at the 
earliest possible moment; 
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(c) A federal State Party to this Convention shall, at the request of any other 
Contracting State transmitted through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, supply a statement of the law and practice of the federation and its 
constituent units in regard to any particular provision of this Convention, showing 





Under this provision, the first issue to determine is whether international commercial 
arbitration falls within the competence of state or federal government (or both).  Under U.S. law, 
such matters are clearly fall within the ambit of federal law in whole or in part, either by virtue of 
the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution (which is broadly construed as a matter of both 
constitutional and arbitral law)
224
 or as a result of Missouri v. Holland (which extends federal 
legislative competence beyond its traditional constitutional boundaries in cases involving 
treaties).
225
  Furthermore, “[i]n joining the Convention, the executive did not take advantage of . . 
. [Article XI(b)] because it viewed arbitration as coming within federal legislative jurisdiction, 
namely the Federal Arbitration Act.”226  Therefore, the U.S. federal government appears 
responsible for the full and appropriate implementation of the New York Convention as a matter 
                                                          
223
 Id. art. XI.   
224
 See U.S. CONST., art. I, §8, cl. 3; Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115-19 (2001); 
Sumitomo Corp. v. Parakopi Compania Maritima, S.A., 477 F. Supp. 737, 740-41 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d 620 
F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1980); LEW ET AL., supra note 24, ¶¶4-2 to 4-26; Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, 
International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 675, 704 (2003) [hereinafter 
Alford, Deference]. 
225
 See U.S. CONST., art. II, §2, cl. 2; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920); see also 
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 209, §302 cmt. d (1987); Duncan B. Hollis, 
Executive Federalism:  Forging New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1327, 1330 (2006); Robert B. Looper, “Federal State” Clauses in Multi-Lateral Instruments, 32 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 162, 169, 196-97, 202 (1955-1956) (discussing how federal-state clauses are unnecessary as 
a matter of U.S. law, given Missouri v. Holland); Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the 
Treaty Power? 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403, 406 (2003).   
226
 Hollis, supra note 225, at 1372 (citation omitted); see also Official Report of the United States 
Delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration (Aug. 15, 1958), 
reprinted in 19 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 91, 114 (2008) [hereinafter Official Report]; Drahozal, supra note 
73, at 1098.   
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There is no general principle of public international law that requires a dispute to be 
heard in a particular forum, so long as the relevant international standards are properly 
applied.
228
  Indeed, “[i]n the vast majority of cases, there is nothing in the treaty text, negotiating 
history, or ratification record that specifies which domestic actors have the power or duty to 
implement the treaty.”229  The New York Convention reflects this standard approach by simply 
placing the obligation to recognize and enforce arbitral awards and agreements on the 
“competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought” rather than designating 
what qualities that authority should have.
230
  Thus, it can be said the New York Convention gives 
federal or non-unitary states that fall within the ambit of Article XI(a) the discretion to decide the 
means by which the Convention will be given domestic application.
231
  
Although only a handful of cases relating to international commercial arbitration have 
been heard in U.S. state courts thus far,
232
 commentators agree that U.S. state courts constitute a 
“competent authority” within the terms of the New York Convention.233  The FAA also 
contemplates the possibility that matters relating to international commercial arbitration can and 
will be heard in state court, since the provisions in Chapter 2 relating to removal from state court 
are permissive rather than mandatory.
234
  As a result, it is clear that U.S. state courts may hear 
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 See New York Convention, supra note 9; Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 
902-03 (5th Cir. 2005); Drahozal, supra note 73, at 108-09.   
228
 See Looper, supra note 225, at 163-64, 202-03. 
229
 Sloss, Two-Step, supra note 62, at 137. 
230
 New York Convention, supra note 9, art. V  
231
 See id. art. XI(a). 
232
 See Strong, Borders, supra note 12, at 2-3; Whytock, Relationship, supra note 12, at 58-67, 75-79.     
233
 See New York Convention, supra note 9, art. V; see also BORN, supra note 9, at 2398, 2703 n.4 ; 
Drahozal, supra note 73, at 113.   
234
 See 9 U.S.C. §205 (2012). 
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matters arising under the New York Convention, although those courts would appear obliged to 
apply and uphold the terms of the Convention pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.
235
   
While U.S. state courts may be competent to hear matters relating to international 
commercial arbitration as a matter of theory, the practical application of this principle could give 
rise to a number of problems.  For example, there is currently a great deal of debate regarding the 
extent to which the FAA preempts state law,
236
 with further developments anticipated in light of 
two cases that are currently pending in the U.S. Supreme Court.
237
   Preemption remains an issue 
of concern in international matters, for although numerous authorities clearly indicate that 
Chapter 2 of the FAA and the New York Convention both apply in state court,
238
 that approach 
has not been universally adopted.
239
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 See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.   
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 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011); Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 
489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1985); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood 
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Supp. 266, 302 (S.D. Tex. 1997), aff’d, 161 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 1998); Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 
S.W. 3d 84, 101 (Tex. 2011); Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 598-99 (Cal. 
2008); Bradley, Breard, supra note 51, at 552-54; Glashausser, supra note 6, at 1252; Alan Scott Rau, 
Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract:  The New Trilogy, 22 AM. REV. INT’L L. 435, 534 (2011); 
Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy:  Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and 
the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 393-96 (2011).   
237
 See Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 215, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 
U.S.L.W. 3070 (2012); In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 219 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub 
nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 81 U.S.L.W. 3070 (2012).  
238
 See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2; Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshuette GmbH, 141 F.3d 
1434, 1440 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 269-73 (1995); 
McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters of London, 944 F.2d 1199, 1208 n.12 (5th Cir. 1991); 
Coutinho Caro & Co. U.S.A., Inc. v. Marcus Trading, Inc., Nos. 3:95CV2362 AWT, 2000 WL 435566, at 
*3 (D. Conn. Mar. 14, 2000); Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992), appeal dismissed by 984 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.1993); Susan L. Karamanian, The Road to the Tribunal 
and Beyond:  International Commercial Arbitration and United States Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 
REV. 17, 36-38 (2002). 
239
 See Swissmex-Rapid S.A. de C.V. v. SP Systems, LLC, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 231 (Cal. App. 2012); 
Tong v. S.A.C. Capital Mgmt., LLC, 835 N.Y.S. 2d 881, 883, 887-888 (N.Y. Sup. 2007), aff’d as 
modified, 52 A.D. 3d 386 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).  However, some state courts have taken due account of 
the Convention.  See New York Convention, supra note 9; Gueyffier v. Ann Summers, Ltd., 50 Cal. Rptr. 
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 Another concern relates to the extent to which U.S. state courts can rely on foreign and 
international law.  At this point, state courts play a “major role in the implementation of . . . 
treaty obligations”240  and “routinely apply international law and foreign law.”241  However, a 
significant number of states have recently adopted (or attempted to adopt) state statutes or state 
constitutional amendments limiting their courts’ ability to rely on anything other than U.S. state 
or federal law.
242
  A number of these measures are quite broad and could threaten the use of 
foreign and international law not only in judicial disputes relating to international commercial 
arbitration
243
 but also in arbitral proceedings themselves.
244
  While most commentators believe 
that these provisions cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny, they are nevertheless disturbing.
245
 
Finally, U.S. courts have exhibited certain conceptual difficulties relating to the question 
of whether the New York Convention or the FAA should prevail in cases of actual or potential 
conflict.
246
  Although this could be a simple issue to resolve under the last-in-time rule,
247
 in that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3d 294, 299-308 (Cal. App. 2006), reversed on other grounds, 184 P.3d 739 (Cal. 2008); Fiske, Emery & 
Assoc. v. Ajello, 577 A.2d 1139 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989); F.A. Richards & Assoc. v. Gen. Marine 
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 Cir. 2012); John R. Crook, Tenth Circuit Upholds Injunction Barring Oklahoma 
Anti-Sharia, Anti-International Law Constitutional Amendment, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 365 (2012).  
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See Aaron Fellmeth, U.S. State Legislation to Limit Use of International and Foreign Law, 106 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 107, 107-17 (2012). 
243
 Courts become involved in international arbitration in a variety of ways and at a variety of times.  See 
STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 13, at 37-87.   
244
 See Fellmeth, supra note 242, at 107. 
245
 See id. at 113. 
246
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; 9 U.S.C. §§201-08 (2012).     
247
 See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 599-600 
(1884) (the “Head Money Cases”); Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 
587 F.3d 714, 722 n.32 , 725 n.47 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-
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Chapter 2 of the FAA was enacted before after the United States’ international obligations were 
formally established under the Convention,
248
 courts and commentators have not relied on this 
sort of mechanistic analysis.   
 
C. Potential Solutions   
The arbitral community has proposed a number of means of resolving the various practical and 
jurisprudential issues that can and do arise with respect to the interpretation of the FAA and the 
New York Convention.
249
  For example, some commentators have suggested that the best way to 
address conflicts between the FAA and the New York Convention is to amend the FAA, with the 
leading proposal advocating the adoption of the Model Arbitration Law in whole or in part.
250
  
Because the Model Arbitration Law was specifically designed to operate in harmony with the 




Other commentators suggest amending the New York Convention,
252
 although this 
approach has its problems.
253
  For example, treaty amendment can be “harder than constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 131 S. Ct. 65 (2010); Bradley, Duality, 
supra note 6, at 160; Moore, Duality, supra note 6, at 2233; Wu, supra note 63, at 574. 
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 See ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 382 (4
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1191 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601, 3602.   
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Born, Freedom, supra note 25, at 23-24; Park, supra note 70, at 1243; see also supra note 70 and 
accompanying text.   
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252
 See Report of the Secretary General, UNCITRAL Working Group II (Arbitration), ¶18, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.108/Add.1 (Jan. 26, 2000); Charles N. Brower II & Jeremy K. Sharpe, The Coming 
Crisis in the International Adjudication System, 19 ARB. INT’L 415, 437 (2003); Carolyn B. Lamm, 
Comments on the Proposal to Amend the New York Convention, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK 
CONVENTION:  XIV ICCA CONG. SER. 697, 706 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2009); Landau, supra note 
123, at 61-79.    
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amendment.”254  Furthermore, amending a treaty does not address problems generated by 
dualism’s need for implementing legislation.255   
However, there is a third alternative to consider, namely the adoption of an appropriate 
rule of interpretation that takes into account the fact that Chapter 2 of the FAA is meant to 
incorporate the New York Convention into domestic law.
256
  This possibility is considered in the 
next section.   
 
IV. Interpretive Alternatives Involving the New York Convention and the FAA 
A. Incorporative Statutes – Intermediaries Between Domestic and International Law 
One of the biggest problems facing U.S. courts in cases relating to international commercial 
arbitration involves the interaction between the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the 
FAA.
257
  Some courts have framed this “difficult constitutional question” as involving the 
“preemptive effect (if any) non-self-executing but implemented treaty provisions have under the 
Supremacy Clause.”258  Other courts have set aside the question of self-execution to focus on 
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other aspects of the relationship between the New York Convention and the FAA.
259
  Regardless 
of how the issue is characterized, it is one that requires resolution.   
Post-Medellin jurisprudence suggests that courts faced with a treaty should look at the 
text of the treaty, along with certain other ancillary factors, to determine what role, if any, that 
treaty has in the domestic legal order.
260
  While this sort of detailed analysis would of course be 
ideal, some courts and commentators instead use a shorthand method of analysis arising out of 
Foster v. Neilson and focus on the simple idea that only non-self-executing treaties require 
implementing legislation.
261
  Under this abbreviated interpretive approach, the mere existence of 
Chapter 2 of the FAA can constitute evidence that the Convention is not self-executing.
262
  
Therefore, the determination about the nature of a treaty, and thus the character of the 
relationship between the treaty and domestic law, can sometimes turn as much on the character 
of domestic legislation as it does on the character of the treaty. 
One major problem with this methodological approach (beyond its potential for 
circularity) is that very little judicial or scholarly attention has been paid to the question of what 
constitutes implementing legislation.
263
  This lacuna is a somewhat surprising given the 
centrality of implementing legislation to the definition of a self-executing treaty,
264
 although the 
sheer volume and diversity of international agreements to which the United States is a party 
suggests that Congress must wield a wide variety of legislative tools to integrate those various 
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instruments and principles into the domestic legal order.
265
  As a result, it is helpful to consider 
briefly the various ways that domestic legislation can relate to international agreements.  One 
interesting and useful analytical paradigm involves the concept of incorporative statutes.
266
   
 
1. Purpose of incorporative statutes 
As a functional matter, incorporative statutes fulfill a variety of practical and policy-based 
purposes relating to the integration of principles of international law into a domestic legal 
system.
267
  For example, using domestic legislation to implement international law offsets 
concerns that direct application of international law would lead to a democratic deficit
268
 or 
threaten constitutional principles regarding the separation of powers.
269
   
Use of domestic legislation can also minimize debates about whether a particular legal 
system should adopt a broad (“transnationalist”) or narrow (“nationalist”) approach to 
international treaties.
270
  Over the years, friction between nationalists and transnationalists has 
become increasingly intractable, largely because it is virtually impossible to ascertain which of 
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the two approaches is ultimately “correct” as a matter of law.271  Instead, the continuing 
discussion about these issues reflects “deeper uncertainties” about international law as a general 
concern and, as such, may not be “susceptible to technical or doctrinal solutions” alone.272   
Although it is often tempting to attempt to identify and impose broad, sweeping, 
universally applicable rules, the ongoing tension between nationalist and transnationalist 
perspectives suggests that there may be times when it is preferable as both a practical and 
jurisprudential matter to adopt what are known as “incompletely theorized agreements.”273  This 
concept, as articulated by Cass Sunstein, posits that “people can often agree on constitutional 
practices, and even on rights, when they cannot agree on constitutional theories.”274   
Incorporative statutes can be viewed as a type of incompletely theorized agreement 
because they outline certain necessary legal practices while simultaneously avoiding deeper 
debates about the extent to which certain international principles automatically apply in U.S. 
courts.
275
  Furthermore, courts asked to interpret and apply treaties that involve incorporative 
statutes do not have to rely on any interpretive canons or analytical presumptions regarding the 
extent to which international law can or should be incorporated into the domestic legal regime.
276
  
Instead, the incorporative statute provides all of the necessary information about the domestically 
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Operationally, incorporative statutes can achieve several different goals.  For example, an 
incorporative statute can translate principles of public international law into terms that are 
consistent with a state’s domestic legal regime.278  Alternatively, an incorporative statute can 
amend the scope or nature of the principle that is transferred into national law so as to make 
various principles more palatable to domestic audiences.
279
  While these measures could change 
the content of the relevant duty so much that a breach of international law occurs,
280
 it is often 
difficult to enforce international norms in cases where voluntary compliance has failed.
281
  
Indeed, there are no known cases where a claim has been brought against a state for a violation 




Because incorporative statutes are a form of domestic legislation, their status within a 
state’s constitutionally mandated legal order is easily established.283  This is not always the case 
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with international law, which may be given no role whatsoever in the domestic regime
284
 or may 
be constitutionally inferior to other sorts of law.
285
     
As useful as incorporative statutes may be, they do not avoid all potential problems.
286
  
Perhaps the most troubling issue arises when judges fail to recognize the international origins of 
these types of enactments.
287
  While it is possible for courts to reach an internationally acceptable 
solution without relying directly on international principles of law,
288
 a lack of appreciation for 
the international principles underlying a particular statute increases the likelihood that a breach 
of public international law will occur.
289
   
Although it is often difficult to establish the appropriate remedy for a breach of 
international law,
290
 continued misapplication of the law by national courts can have serious 
repercussions, particularly in the commercial realm.
291
  Indeed, the connection between 
ineffective participation in the international commercial arbitration regime and reduced trade is 
well-established in international legal circles.
292
  Therefore, states that continually misapply the 
New York Convention are not only likely to see lower levels of international trade as foreign 
parties decide to forego business with entities located in countries that make recovery on an 
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arbitral award inherently risky, but those transactions that do go forward may be subject to a 
“litigation premium” to offset the cost and uncertainty associated with recovery on an award.293  
 
2. Types of incorporative statutes   
The ever-increasing relevance of international law to matters of previously exclusive domestic 
concern
294
  has resulted in an exponential increase in the number of incorporative statutes over 
the last few decades.
295
  However, different legal systems use different means of incorporating 
international principles into domestic law, as the UNCITRAL survey report shows.
296
  As a 
result, it can be difficult to determine which pieces of legislation are incorporative.  Indeed, the 
only reliable means of identifying an incorporative statute is by its function.
297
   
Under a functional approach, it is possible to conclude that   
an “incorporative statute” is any statute that incorporates language or concepts 
derived from an international treaty.  On a functional level, this definition 
includes any statute (1) that incorporates a treaty by reference, (2) whose text 
mirrors or closely tracks the test of a treaty, or (3) is otherwise clearly intended to 
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Such statutes can “use[] all or part of the treaty language and incorporate[] it as a statutory matter 
into domestic law” or can “paraphrase the treaty language, or ‘clarify’ or elaborate on the treaty 
language.”299   
This emphasis on functionality is extremely useful because it permits further distinctions 
between archetypical forms of “enabling” or “implementing” legislation, on the one hand, and 
statutes intended to “facilitate the domestic implementation of self-executing treaties,” on the 
other.
300
  Although the two types of enactments may not seem all that different,  
including facilitating legislation in the definition [of incorporate statutes] focuses 
attention on the question of what it means when a statute, by its terms, 
incorporates language or concepts from a document that has a separate existence 
on the international plane, even if its ultimate goal is simply to supply procedural 




This is an important observation, since it suggests that there may be times when it is 
necessary or appropriate to adopt domestic legislation ancillary to a self-executing treaty.  
Indeed, international commercial arbitration might constitute an excellent example of this type of 
situation, given the brevity of the New York Convention and the need, even in monist legal 




The next question, of course, is how to determine whether a particular statute is enabling 
or facilitative.  Because the function of the two types of legislation is directly related to the 
question of self-execution, it might initially appear appropriate to consider whether the treaty that 
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generated the relevant statute is self-executing or not.  However, that inquiry can prove 
inconclusive, as illustrated by the case of the New York Convention.
303
   
Furthermore, focusing solely on the status of the treaty would ignore important 
information regarding the intent of Congress in adopting the statute in question.  While the self-
execution analysis does include an intent element, that inquiry focuses primarily on the 
President’s and Senate’s intent in ratifying the treaty.304  It is possible that an analysis of the 
incorporative statute could yield a slightly different result, since the entire Congress is involved 
in the process of enacting domestic legislation.
305
  Given that incorporative statutes play an 
important and diverse role in dualist regimes as both a practical and policy-based matter,
306
 it 
appears appropriate to consider both the text and the purpose of such legislation when 
determining whether that enactment is facilitative or enabling.
307
   
Although a comprehensive examination of the text and drafting history of Chapter 2 of 
the FAA is beyond the scope of this Article, it is nevertheless possible to outline some of the 
basic issues relevant to this analysis.
308
  On the one hand, it appears as if Chapter 2 could be 
construed as a form of implementing legislation, based on language in Section 201 stating that 
“[t]he Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 
1958, shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter.”309  This 
                                                          
303
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; see also supra notes 78-122 and accompanying text. 
304
 See Bederman, supra note 133, at 1000; Glashausser, supra note 6, at 1334-35; Jackson, supra note 51, 
at 328; Wuerth, supra note 296, at 4, 9; supra note 64 and accompanying text.   
305
 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522 n.12 (2008); Wuerth, supra note 296, at 4, 9.   
306
 See supra notes 433-82 and accompanying text. 
307
 No effort is made here to assign the relative weight of each of these constituent elements.  However, it 
would appear appropriate to conclude that a high degree of certainty regarding the outcome of one 
analysis (either statutory construction or treaty interpretation) would diminish the degree of certainty 
needed to establish the other element.  
308
 Further reading is available.  See Hulbert, supra note 170, at 53-59 (regarding Chapter 2); Margaret L. 
Moses, Statutory Misconstruction:  How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never 
Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. Rev. 99, 101-13 (2006) (regarding Chapter 1). 
309
 9 U.S.C. §201 (2012); see also Medellin, 552 U.S. at 521-22.    
57 
 
conclusion is further supported by the fact that when “President Johnson forwarded the New 
York Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent on American accession, . . . the 
President’s message stated that American ratification would be deferred until necessary 
implementing legislation had been enacted.”310   
On the other hand, it is also possible to conclude that Chapter 2 does not in fact 
implement the New York Convention but instead simply “facilitate[s] the domestic 
implementation of [a] self-executing treat[y].”311  This interpretation of Chapter 2 may seem 
more appropriate, given that “[a] treaty-facilitating statute is one that spells out how a given 
provision in a self-executing treaty should be applied by courts called upon to resolve cases and 
controversies that turn on this provision.”312  Many of the procedural provisions found in Chapter 
2, including those relating to federal jurisdiction, venue, removal, compelling arbitration, naming 
of arbitrators and confirmation of the award, appear facilitative, as does the explicit direction to 
incorporate Chapter 1 of the FAA (a patently non-incorporative statute focusing entirely on 
procedural issues) to the extent possible and necessary.
313
  Furthermore, this interpretation of 




Characterizing Chapter 2 of the FAA as facilitative would also be consistent with 
practices found in other jurisdictions.
315
  For example, France, a well-known monist state, has 
                                                          
310
 Hulbert, supra note 170, at 54; see also Message from the President of the United States Transmitting 
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Exec. E., 90
th
 Cong., 2d 
Sess. 17, 22 (Apr. 24, 1968), 7 I.L.M. 1042, 1042 (1968) (stating “[c]hanges in Title 9 (Arbitration) of the 
United States Code will be required before the United States becomes a party to the convention”); 
Drahozal, supra note 73, at 102-03.  
311
 Coyle, supra note 3, at 666-67. 
312
 Id.    
313
 See 9 U.S.C. §§202-08; see also 9 U.S.C. §§1-16. 
314
 See 9 U.S.C. §201.   
315
 See 9 U.S.C. §§201-08. 
58 
 
adopted an international commercial arbitration statute that covers many of the same issues as 
Chapter 2 of the FAA and achieves many of the same purposes.
316
  The Model Arbitration Law 
serves a similarly facilitative function and makes no effort to operate as a form of implementing 
legislation.
317
  Indeed, the Model Arbitration Law has been adopted in numerous jurisdictions 
that do not need to adopt any sort of enabling legislation to give domestic effect to treaties.
318
  
Framing Chapter 2 as a facilitative instrument would also be consistent with the views of 
numerous scholars and practitioners who have recognized the need for states to adopt ancillary 




Based on the above, it is at least arguable that Chapter 2 of the FAA is facilitative, rather 
than enabling.
320
  However, consistent with Sunstein’s theory of incompletely theorized 
agreements, it may not be necessary to reach a definitive conclusion about the nature of Chapter 
2.
321
  Instead, simply framing those provisions as incorporative may yield sufficiently useful 
results.
322
  The following discussion therefore considers the various differences in outcome that 
would result if Chapter 2 of the FAA were considered to be an incorporative statute as opposed 
to a form of implementing legislation.
323
  In so doing, it is necessary to consider the interpretive 
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approach that would be taken if the New York Convention were considered self-executing, an 




B. Interpreting the New York Convention and the FAA Under the Vienna 
Convention 
If the New York Convention is considered self-executing, then it should be interpreted pursuant 
to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.
325
  Numerous works have been written on how 
to apply these measures, and it is unnecessary for this Article to delve into those matters too 
deeply.
326
  Nevertheless, it is useful to discuss how this analysis might be conducted under the 
New York Convention, since international commercial arbitration presents some unique 
challenges and opportunities.
327
  Interestingly, this approach allows the introduction of some 
important information that has not typically been considered by U.S. courts.
328
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According to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, a court must look at “the ordinary 
meaning” of the treaty, in its “context and in the light of its object and purpose.”329  Context can 
be gleaned from both the text of the treaty as well as “any subsequent agreement between the 
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions” and “any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation.”330  Article 32 indicates that the travaux préparatoires may be taken 
into account to confirm the interpretation resulting from the analysis under Article 31 or to assist 
in cases of ambiguity or absurdity.
331
  Each of these factors is considered separately.   
 
1. Purpose 
The purpose of the New York Convention is uncontroversial and widely acknowledged by 
authorities both inside and outside the United States.
332
  In the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the “principal purpose of the [New York] Convention ‘was to encourage the recognition and 
enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify the 
standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the 
signatory countries.’”333  Furthermore, international commercial arbitration holds a place of 
special esteem in the U.S. legal order, since 
concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and 
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial 
system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the 
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As a result, U.S. courts “should be most cautious before interpreting . . . domestic legislation in 
such manner as to violate international agreements” such as the New York Convention.335   
 
2. Context 
The second interpretive element to be considered under the Vienna Convention is the context of 
the agreement.
336
  This step includes an analysis of both the text of the treaty to be interpreted as 
well as the subsequent agreements and practices of the parties.
337
   
 
a. Text 
A comprehensive analysis of the text of the New York Convention is beyond the scope of this 
Article, although courts construing the Convention in light of a particular dispute will of course 
need to focus on the precise language at issue.
338
   However, for purposes of this discussion it is 
sufficient to consider the overall structure of the Convention, which can be in some ways 
confusing.
339
   
On the one hand, a number of provisions in the New York Convention explicitly state 
that they are to be applied exclusively, suggesting that the treaty is to be applied by states parties 
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in a single, uniform manner.
340
  On the other hand, the Convention also contemplates a 
significant role for domestic law.
341
  There are several issues on which the New York 
Convention is entirely silent, thereby creating a gap that only national law can fill.
342
  Other 
matters are specifically made subject to domestic law, again diminishing the expectation that the 
Convention creates a single comprehensive and universally applicable international regime.
343
  In 
still other instances, the New York Convention allows the parties to choose whether to rely on 
procedures outlined in the Convention or those available under national law.
344
   
 The New York Convention therefore demonstrate a mixed system which reserves a 
significant amount of discretion to states parties to decide how to address certain matters relating 
to international commercial arbitration while nevertheless imposing a single, internationally 
applicable standard with respect to other questions of arbitral law and procedure.
345
  Those 
elements that are subject to domestic law by choice or necessity typically cannot lead to a breach 
of international law, since the treaty does not establish any internationally enforceable criteria.
346
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However, a violation of international law can occur with respect to those aspects of the 
New York Convention that must be applied in a single, internationally consistent manner.
347
  The 
most well-known areas of tension involve Article V, which describes the exclusive grounds for 
objections to the recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award under the Convention,
348
 and 
Article II, which sets forth the necessary form requirements.
349
  Some of the variations in 
approach can clearly be traced to the use of implementing legislation in dualist jurisdictions.
350
   
  
b. Subsequent practices of the parties 
Part of the contextual analysis under the Vienna Convention involves an evaluation of the 
subsequent practices of the parties.
351
  While this inquiry may be difficult to undertake in some 
areas of law as a practical matter, the international arbitral community has spent a considerable 
amount of time and effort compiling detailed and reliable data on the way in which the New 
York Convention has been construed and applied around the world.
352
  This information, which 
has been gathered for more than fifty years, is published in various yearbooks and electronic 
                                                          
347
 See New York Convention, supra note 9.  
348
 See id. art. V; ICCA GUIDE, supra note 123, at 80; BORN, supra note 9, at 2736; Hulbert, supra note 
170, at 65.   
349
 See New York Convention, supra note 9, art. II; ICCA GUIDE, supra note 123, at 37-38, 43; VAN DEN 
BERG, supra note 71, at 387-89; Alvarez, Article II(2), supra note 171, at 71; Strong, Writing, supra note 
30, at 53-72. 
350
 See BORN, supra note 9, at 100-01, 2868-69; STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 13, at 69; Park, supra note 
70, at 1249-54; Strong, Monism and Dualism, supra note 20. 
351
 See Vienna Convention, supra note 43, art. 31(3)(b). Notably, incorrect interpretation of an 
international treaty, even if on a widespread basis, cannot constitute a subsequent practice.  See IAN 
MCTAGGART SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 138 (2d ed. 1984).  
Therefore, any errors in actual practice cannot be considered a guide to interpretation under the Vienna 
Convention.  See Vienna Convention, supra note 43; SINCLAIR, supra, at 138. 
352
 See UNCITRAL, Dissemination of Decisions Concerning UNCITRAL Legal Texts and Uniform 
Interpretation of Such Texts:  Note by Secretariat, ¶¶8, 16, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/267, (Feb. 21, 1985); VAN 
DEN BERG, supra note 71, at 2-3; Sanders, supra note 141, at vi. 
64 
 
databases so as to promote international consistency relating to the interpretation and application 
of the New York Convention.
353
   
These materials could be viewed in one of two lights.  First, these resources could be seen 
as reflecting the subsequent practices of the parties to the New York Convention and could be 
considered relevant to an analysis of an arbitration agreement or award falling under the 
Convention on those grounds.
354
  This approach is consistent with that taken in U.S. courts, since 
the U.S. Supreme Court has itself relied on “‘the postratification understanding’ of signatory 
states” when interpreting treaties in other contexts.355  Therefore, U.S. courts can and likely 
should consider the materials contained in these yearbooks and databases as relevant to the 
interpretation of the New York Convention.
356
  Indeed, a judge’s guide recently published by the 
Federal Judicial Center specifically suggests that courts consider international consensus when 
considering matters relating to international commercial arbitration.
357
 
Second, these yearbooks and databases might be viewed as reflecting the customary 
international law of international commercial arbitration.  Although the international arbitral 
community has not discussed the development of customary international law with respect to the 
procedural aspects of the New York Convention,
358
 Ian Brownlie has noted that “collections of 
                                                          
353
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 71-137; VAN DEN 
BERG, supra note 71, at 2-6 (discussing the Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration); Bachand, supra note 
72, at 98; Michael Joachim Bonell, The CISG, European Contract Law and the Development of a World 
Contract Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 5 (2007); Sanders, supra note 141, at vi; Strong, Sources, supra note 
14, at 137. 
354
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; Vienna Convention, supra note 43, art. 31(3). 
355
 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507 (2008) (citation omitted); see also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW, supra note 209, §03 cmt. c; Glashausser, supra note 6, 1257;  
356
 See New York Convention, supra note 9; Strong, Monism & Dualism, supra note 20; Strong, Writing, 
supra note 30, at 85, 87. 
357
 See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 13, at 93. 
358
 Extensive commentary exists regarding the possible development of a substantive form of international 
customary law known as lex mercatoria.  See KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF 
THE NEW LEX MERCATORIA (2010); Emmanuel Gaillard, Transnational Law:  A Legal System of a Method 
of Decision Making? 17 ARB. INT’L 59, 59-72 (2001). 
65 
 
municipal cases . . . are important in any assessment of the customary law.”359  These decisions 
therefore might be admissible in U.S. courts pursuant to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention, which can be read as referring to customary international law as well as 
international treaties.
360
   
Although this second approach appears viable as a jurisprudential matter, some problems 
could arise.  For example, as a practical matter, U.S. courts are often more inclined to “consult 
convenient codifications or summaries” of customary international law rather than the original 
materials.
361
  While this obstacle could be overcome by recourse to any one of a number of 
excellent treatises in this area of law,
362
 U.S. courts may be somewhat hesitant to rely on 
customary international law given its somewhat suspect status in U.S. domestic law.
363
  
Therefore, at this point, parties are probably better off relying on the subsequent practices 
provision of the Vienna Convention or on U.S. Supreme Court precedent when presenting this 
material in U.S. courts,
364
 unless and until the Court provides any additional guidance regarding 
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c. Subsequent agreements of the parties 
“Context” in the Vienna Convention also includes any subsequent agreements of the parties.366  
Because the Convention requires, rather than merely permits, recourse to the parties’ subsequent 
agreements, courts should give significant weight to these authorities.
367
  However, the term 
“agreement” is not defined in the Convention, thus raising questions as to the level of formality 
that is needed to constitute an “agreement” under the Convention.368   
Commentators have suggested that “[t]he agreement need not be in binding or treaty form 
but must demonstrate that the parties intended their understanding to constitute an agreed basis 
for interpretation.”369  One item in the area of international commercial arbitration that might 
qualify under these criteria is a recommendation promulgated by UNCITRAL regarding the 
interpretation and application of Articles II(2) and VII(1) of the New York Convention 
(UNCITRAL Recommendation).
370
  The Recommendation is very brief in its substantive 
provisions, stating in relevant part that it “[r]ecommends that article II, paragraph 2, of the [New 
York Convention] be applied recognizing that the circumstances described therein are not 
exhaustive.”371  Although the UNCITRAL Recommendation is somewhat limited in its scope, 
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the document could nevertheless result in a significant change in how form requirements are 
interpreted and applied around the world, since the provision not only allows but encourages a 
widespread liberalization of the current regime.
372
   
 The UNCITRAL Recommendation is part of a recent “explosion in the number of 
declarative texts in the field of international law.”373  This kind of “soft law” is often seen as 
advantageous because it allows international agreement and implementation to be reached more 
quickly and more easily than more formal measures.
374
  Soft law also encourages incremental 
development of the law, which many observers believe to be useful in achieving legitimacy.
375
  
However, soft law’s real advantage may be the way that it provides direct and authoritative 
guidance to judges regarding the way in which certain international instruments are to be 
construed.
376
   
Commentators have long supported the use of soft law in international commercial 
arbitration, since “nonbinding general principles can achieve the goal of uniform or, at least, 
harmonized law by providing general principles that can more easily accommodate various legal 
traditions.”377  Some of these devices “can serve as evidence of the formation of customary 
international law.”378   
                                                          
372
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373
 See Dubinsky, supra note 61, at 468. 
374
 Soft law can be developed more quickly because it does not need to harmonize conflicting legal 
principles or obtain formal ratification from states.  See Henry Deeb Gabriel, The Advantages of Soft Law 
in International Commercial Arbitration:  The Role of UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL, and the Hague 
Conference, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 655, 661-65 (2009); see also Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft 
Law:  Lessons From Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 594-99, 624-25 (2008).  
375
 See Sharon Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Incrementalism in Global Lawmaking, 32 BROOK. J. 
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At this point it is unclear how U.S. courts will treat the UNCITRAL Recommendation.
379
  
On the one hand, some commentators have noted that “[w]hen interpreting U.S. statutes that 
incorporate . . . international law, courts typically refuse to regard informal international 
agreements and declarations as sources of law for purposes of construing and applying the 
domestic statute.”380  However, UNCITRAL reports and recommendations have proven 
persuasive to federal courts in other contexts where Congress has adopted an instrument drafted 
by UNCITRAL.
381
  Furthermore, at least one federal court has looked to a UNCITRAL report to 
help construe the provisions of a U.S. state statute based on the Model Arbitration Law.
382
 These 
phenomena suggest that U.S. courts may be amenable to considering the UNCITRAL 




3. Travaux préparatoires 
The final factor that may be considered in a Vienna Convention analysis involves the travaux 
préparatoires, which may be used to supplement the inquiry conducted under Article 31.
384
  
Although travaux préparatoires can provide a wealth of information regarding the drafting 
history of various elements of the New York Convention,
385
 U.S. courts have seldom referred to 
these materials in practice.
386
  It is unclear whether the failure to refer to the travaux 
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381
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préparatoires results from a desire to limit recourse to international legal resources or from a 
conclusion that consideration of such materials is unnecessary in a particular instance.  
 
4. Interim conclusion 
As the preceding shows, a full-fledged evaluation of the New York Convention under a Vienna 
Convention analysis would open the door to consideration of a number of new materials, 
including judicial opinions from other jurisdictions, the UNCITRAL Recommendation and, to a 
lesser extent, the travaux préparatoires.
387
  Although many of these resources are not currently 
part of the standard U.S. analysis, the methodological approach outlined in the Vienna 
Convention is nevertheless consistent with that reflected in U.S. law and practice, which suggests 
that courts can and likely should consider these types of materials going forward.
388
   
One element that is notably missing from the Vienna Convention analysis is any 
consideration of the text or purpose of Chapter 2 of the FAA.
389
  This lack of attention to 
domestic legislation is understandable in situations where the underlying treaty is to be given 
direct effect within the domestic legal order.
390
  However, international commercial arbitration is 
a field that involves both international treaties and domestic legislation.
391
  The question 
therefore becomes how best to proceed when an international treaty and a domestic statute 
address the same or complementary subject matters. 
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390
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C. Interpreting the New York Convention and the FAA under the Charming Betsy Canon 
Under the analytical framework adopted by U.S. courts, reliance on the Vienna Convention or 
similar interpretive methodologies is only appropriate if the New York Convention is determined 
to be self-executing.
392
  If the Convention is not self-executing, then its provisions are not 
directly applicable in U.S. courts, although the United States remains bound to the terms of the 
Convention as a matter of international law.
393
  In these situations, courts are required to analyze 
the relationship between domestic and international law as a matter of constitutional law.
394
   
One of the most well-known constitutional canons relating to potential conflicts between 
international and domestic law is the Charming Betsy canon.
395
  This longstanding interpretive 
device arose out of a case known as Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, which involved a ship 
(the Charming Betsy) that was seized by the U.S. Navy on the grounds that the ship was 
operating in violation of a domestic statute prohibiting U.S. citizens from trading with France.
396
  
The owner, who claimed that he had previously renounced his U.S. citizenship in favor of 
Danish citizenship, took the view that applying the statute to him would violate the law of 
nations, particularly those provisions that protected the commercial trading rights of citizens 
from neutral states.
397
   
The case resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court’s historic edict that ambiguous domestic 
statutes “ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
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construction remains.”398  This principle, which has subsequently been held to apply to situations 
involving both self-executing and non-self-executing treaties,
399
 has been considered by 
commentators in a variety of contexts, including international commercial arbitration.
400
  
However, no federal court appears to have relied upon the Charming Betsy when considering the 
potential overlap between the New York Convention and the FAA.
401
   
Although this situation is in some ways inexplicable given the confusion about the 
relationship between and interpretation of the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the FAA, 
it may be that the conventional reading of the Charming Betsy, which is somewhat narrow, does 
not appear relevant to matters relating to international commercial arbitration.
402
  However, some 
commentators believe that the canon has expanded beyond its traditional boundaries and now 
offers three additional applications.
403
  Some of these principles may find traction in cases 
involving international commercial arbitration. 
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First, commentators suggest that the Charming Betsy could be interpreted as establishing 
a presumption against extraterritorial application of a statute.
404
  This reading of the canon acts as 
a type of “‘braking mechanism’ intended to ‘restrain the scope of federal enactments’”405 and 
could prove useful in cases where parties seek to apply the FAA extraterritorially in 
contravention to the law and practice of international commercial arbitration.
406
   
One place where this principle might be relevant is in disputes involving Section 206 of 
the FAA.
407
  That provision indicates that U.S. courts may compel arbitration at “any place . . . 
provided for” in the arbitration agreement, “whether that place is within or without the United 
States.”408  While this provision encourages robust enforcement of arbitration agreements and 
may therefore appear to comply with the pro-arbitration principles of the New York Convention, 
the arbitral community is split as to whether a court has the power to compel arbitration 
extraterritorially.
409
   
Because the Charming Betsy only applies in cases of statutory ambiguity, it could be 
difficult to apply the canon to cases involving motions to compel arbitration, since this aspect of 
Section 206 is not ambiguous.
410
  However, the second portion of Section 206 does seem to 
reflect the necessary degree of ambiguity, since that provision indicates that U.S. courts “may 
also appoint arbitrators in accordance with the provisions of the agreement” but does not state 
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whether that power is limited to arbitrations seated within the United States.
411
  Commentators 
have universally denounced the extraterritorial appointment of arbitral tribunals, which suggests 
that the Charming Betsy canon could prove useful in limiting this sort of questionable 
behavior.
412
   
Other U.S. practices could also benefit from an extraterritorial braking device.  For 
example, the international arbitral community is strongly divided about the propriety of foreign 
anti-suit injunctions
413
 and discovery under 28 U.S.C. §1782,
414
 and the Charming Betsy canon 
could provide a principled means of limiting one or the other of those devices.
415
  
The second variation on the Charming Betsy requires courts to “endeavor to construe” 
any statute and treaty that “relate to the same subject” in a manner that would “give effect to 
both, if that can be done without violating the language of either.”416  This principle has been 
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described as “the canon against implied repeal” and works to avoid unnecessary application of 
the last-in-time rule.
417
   
Interestingly, this interpretation of the Charming Betsy could prove somewhat difficult to 
apply in international commercial arbitration.
418
  Indeed, experience suggests that a number of 
problems can arise when courts attempt to harmonize domestic and international law in the area 
of arbitration, resulting in potential breaches of the New York Convention.
419
 
For example, importation of the concept of manifest disregard of law from domestic law 
into disputes governed by the New York Convention has generated a considerable amount of 
controversy and arguably constitutes a breach of the United States’ treaty obligations under the 
Convention.
420
  Other difficulties arise when U.S. courts attempt to combine the form 
requirements of the New York Convention with those reflected in Chapter 2 of the FAA.
421
  Not 
only is it possible that this practice impermissibly alters the standards used to identify when an 
arbitration agreement or award falls under the Convention, but the various circuit splits that exist 
within the United States in this area of law violate the New York Convention’s overarching goal 
of promoting predictability in matters relating to international arbitration.
422
  Therefore, this 




 The third and final way of expanding the Charming Betsy canon involves reading the 
case as standing “for the proposition that Congress generally intends that ambiguous statutes – 
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including statutes that are not by their nature incorporative – be read to conform to international 
norms.”424  Under this approach, the Charming Betsy would act as “an ‘engine’ that seeks to 
‘conform U.S. law to the aspirations of international law.’”425 
 While some courts and commentators would doubtless applaud this reading of the 
Charming Betsy canon,
426
 others would disagree.
427
  The biggest concern about this particular 
proposal involves its breadth.  Not only would this interpretation of the Charming Betsy apply to 
incorporative statutes that have a direct and logical link to international law, it would also apply 
to non-incorporative statutes that have no obvious connection to international legal principles.
428
  
Furthermore, this interpretive technique relies on international customary law to the same extent 
as international treaties, which can lead to a number of practical and jurisprudential problems.
429
   
However, the most notable concern involving this third variation on the Charming Betsy 
is that it triggers the potentially irreconcilable policy debate between nationalists and 
transnationalists about the role that international law should play in modern society.
430
  Since it is 
both unwise and unnecessary to adopt an interpretive canon that generates as many problems as 
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it solves, this third approach seems ill-conceived, at least in the context of international 
commercial arbitration. 
 The various iterations of the Charming Betsy canon therefore appear largely unhelpful to 
international commercial arbitration, either because of a lack of relevance (the traditional 
reading) or inapposite results (the second and third variations).
431
  While the first variation on the 
conventional interpretation of the canon (i.e., the prohibition on extraterritorial application) could 
prove useful in certain limited circumstances,
432
 there may be other interpretive devices that 
provide assistance on a broader range of issues. 
 
D. Interpreting the New York Convention and the FAA Under the Borrowed Treaty Rule 
 1. Applying the borrowed treaty rule in theory  
Although the third variation on the Charming Betsy canon proved problematic because of its 
excessive breadth, the proposal’s aim (i.e., increased integration of international and domestic 
law) has been supported by commentators who believe that the recent expansion of international 
law that has occurred as a result of globalization requires a new understanding of how 
international legal principles affect national law.
433
  One way of obtaining the benefits of that 
approach while minimizing the concerns enunciated by those adopting more of a nationalist 
perspective could be through adoption of the borrowed treaty rule, which is an interpretive 
technique devised by John Coyle.
434
  This rule, which could be applied in both the United States 
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and in other jurisdictions, would “facilitate[] the consistent interpretation of texts across multiple 
jurisdictions, thereby making possible the establishment of truly international standards.”435   
Coyle’s moderately internationalist interpretive approach is consistent with techniques 
proposed by commentators from other countries and in other fields.  For example, Frédéric 
Bachand, a Canadian scholar writing from the arbitral perspective, has suggested that “judges 
sitting in states that have signalled their willingness to support the international arbitration 
system must consider the relevant international normative context while answering questions of 
international arbitration law to which local sources offer no obvious answer.”436  Bachand’s 
thesis is that “domestic courts can and should recognize the existence of this body of 
transnational rules, but also – in some circumstances – that these rules have constraining effects 
in [the courts’] domestic legal orders, and thus on their decisionmaking process.”437   Specialists 




Interestingly, the borrowed treaty rule is not only consistent with the methodology used 
by several courts in international disputes,
439
 it is also similar to certain techniques used within 
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the domestic U.S. legal order.
440
  The closest of these interpretive analogues is the “borrowed 
statute rule,” which indicates that states that have adopted (or “borrowed”) a statute from another 
jurisdiction are typically deemed to have also adopted the original jurisdiction’s interpretation of 
that statute.
441
  However, the borrowed treaty rule also resembles other domestic devices, 
including reception statutes
442




The borrowed treaty rule also resembles interpretive methods used in cases involving 
self-executing treaties.
444
  These similarities result from the recognition that there is little, if any, 
difference between a self-executing treaty and a statute that incorporates a treaty by reference, 
either in whole or in part.
445
  However, 
[t]his does not . . . mean that courts should read a directly incorporative statute as 
though it were itself a treaty.  Rather, it means that when a court is called upon to 
interpret a statute that copies language from a treaty, that court should seek, 





Furthermore, because the borrowed treaty rule “makes it unnecessary to go down the 
treacherous path of reading incorporative statutes as though they themselves were 
treaties,” the rule “preserv[es] a clear line between statutes and treaties and, perhaps more 
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importantly, between canons of treaty interpretation and canons of statutory 
interpretation.
447
   
This approach can be justified on a number of policy grounds.
448
  For example, 
reading an incorporative statute in a manner that is consistent with its underlying treaty 
can result in enhanced effectiveness of the international legal regime, a decrease in 
intentional or unintentional failure to implement the relevant norms, increased assurances 
that all states parties will comply with their obligations and an increased ability for 
individuals to rely on international law.
449
   
Furthermore, many of the policy arguments against allowing direct domestic 
effect of international treaties do not apply to the borrowed treaty rule.
450
  For example, 
direct application of treaties eliminates the ability of Congress to “reword the treaty to 
match domestic circumstances,” “elaborate on the treaty provisions, which [Congress] 
may view as ambiguous” and “delay application [of the treaty] to allow internal 
consensus and acceptance to develop.”451  However, the borrowed treaty rule respects the 
ability of Congress to limit domestic application of certain aspects of the treaty or alter its 
meaning in some manner.
452
  If such intentions are clear, they will be upheld under this 
particular interpretive canon.
453
   
 The borrowed treaty rule also addresses the “difficult constitutional question” 
relating to the role (if any) that a non-self-executing but implemented treaty has in the 
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  For example, under the borrowed treaty rule, a “[c]ourt’s 
interpretation of an incorporative statute should always be consistent with its 
interpretation of the source treaty text unless there is compelling evidence that Congress, 
in enacting the statute, intended to deviate from the rule set forth in the treaty.”455  The 
process requires the court to “pivot away from the domestic text (a statute duly enacted 
by Congress), to the international text (a treaty duly ratified by the United States), and . . . 
confirm that the court’s construction of the former is consistent with its interpretation of 
the latter.”456  Although this process gives a considerable amount of weight to 
internationalist concerns, it is also guided, and ultimately controlled, by domestic 
principles of law.  
 When applying the borrowed treaty rule, courts must interpret the underlying 
treaty in a manner consistent with the Vienna Convention or national law.
457
  However, 
the interpretation of the underlying treaty is not made directly applicable within the 
United States, as would occur in cases involving a self-executing treaty.
458
  Instead, the 
interpretation of the treaty forms a baseline for comparison with the interpretation of the 
incorporative statute.  The borrowed treaty rule indicates that those two analyses should 
arrive at the same outcome, absent Congressional intention to the contrary.
459
  
 This result is considered appropriate because  
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[t]he basic purpose of an incorporative statute is to incorporate into . . . [domestic 
law] a set of rules that are consistent with an internationally agreed upon standard 
set forth in a treaty. . . . International treaties first establish these international 
standards and, thereafter, those states that choose to ratify the treaties incorporate 




Thus, the borrowed treaty rule “is entirely consistent with the institutional role of courts 
in the [U.S.] constitutional structure,” since the rule expressly contemplates the fact that 
whenever “the legislative and the executive branches, acting together, choose to enact legislation 
that incorporates the terms of a treaty, they are making a decision to conform domestic law to 
international law.”461  Indeed, if the courts were “to interpret an incorporative statute in a way 
that differs materially from the way they would interpret the relevant provision in the text of the 
source treaty, they would, in effect, be undermining the political branches’ decision to 
incorporate a particular international rule into [domestic law].”462 
 
 2. Applying the borrowed treaty rule in international commercial arbitration 
Having described how the borrowed treaty rule is applied as a matter of theory, the next question 
is how the rule is applied as a practical matter, particularly in cases involving international 
commercial arbitration.  Fortunately, the process is relatively straightforward.   
First, courts review the text of the treaty to which the incorporative statute relates.
463
  “If 
the text of the treaty is clear, then the court should read the incorporative statute to conform to 
the borrowed treaty text unless there is compelling evidence that Congress intended a different 
result.”464  This is a relatively easy task in international commercial arbitration, given the brevity 
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and clarity of the New York Convention.
465
  Furthermore, this approach eliminates the 
possibility that a court might inadvertently adopt a course of action that is contrary to the express 
language of the Convention.
466
  
 However, “if there is any ambiguity in the text of the treaty, the court should, as 
necessary, resort to those special canons of construction that have customarily been used to 
resolve such ambiguities in treaties.”467  Though the New York Convention is relatively 
unambiguous, one potential area of concern involves the form requirement under Article II.
468
  
Under the borrowed treaty rule, those matters would be considered pursuant to the interpretive 
techniques described in the Vienna Convention or national law,
469
 which would empower courts 
to consult the same kinds of resources (such as international consensus relating to the states 
parties’ subsequent practices and the UNCITRAL Recommendation) that would be available if 
the New York Convention were considered a self-executing treaty.
470
   
“Once the ambiguity has been resolved, the court should read the incorporative statute to 
conform to the borrowed treaty, . . . unless there is compelling evidence that Congress intended a 
different result.”471  This step sets the borrowed treaty rule apart from an interpretative 
methodology based solely on the Vienna Convention, since the borrowed treaty rule expressly 
directs courts to consider the text and intent of incorporative statutes such as Chapter 2 of the 
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  This approach should give some comfort to proponents of a nationalist approach to 
international law, since domestic law is allowed to play an important role in the interpretation 
process.
473
  However, the rule also includes a rebuttable presumption that Congress intended to 
adopt a statute that was consistent with the text and purpose of the underlying treaty.
474
  This 
second attribute should win the support of those who take an internationalist approach to law, 
since this technique decreases the likelihood that the United States will breach its international 
obligations in situations where domestic and international law cover the same subject matter.
475
 
The borrowed treaty rule can also be contrasted to the Charming Betsy canon.
476
  
Because “[t]he borrowed treaty rule [is] used to read incorporative statutes even where there is 
no obvious conflict between the statute and the treaty, and, most importantly, even where the text 
of the statute at issue is not on its face ambiguous,” the rule is somewhat broader than the 
Charming Betsy canon, which is limited to cases of legislative ambiguity.
477
  However, the 
outcome under the borrowed treaty rule is in many ways analogous to that which arises under the 
Charming Betsy canon, since both techniques insure that the interpretation of the domestic 
statute “is consistent with the rule of international law being incorporated.”478  In other ways, the 
two methodologies are quite distinct, since the borrowed treaty rule engages directly with “the 
core function of the incorporative statute, that is, to incorporate an internationally agreed upon 
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 The borrowed treaty rule also provides a welcome degree of flexibility, since “[t]he 
strength of the rule may vary . . . depending on how closely the text of the incorporative statute 
tracks the language in the relevant treaty.”480  If there are “substantial” differences between the 
treaty and the statute, then the justification for “conforming one’s reading of the statute to the 
treaty are correspondingly less compelling, even if the underlying aim of the statute is to 
incorporate the terms of the treaty.”481  In this latter category of cases, the legislature has 
obviously contemplated important differences between the international understanding and 
domestic application, and the domestic rule will govern in national courts as a matter of 
constitutional law, even though the international obligation continues at a state-to-state level.
482
  
Notably, international commercial arbitration does not appear to suffer from this kind of 





4. Interpreting the New York Convention and the FAA Under a Teleological 
 Approach 
The final interpretive technique to consider involves a teleological approach to “domestic 
provisions adopted with a view to giving effect domestically to” the New York Convention.484  
Although this methodology is aimed specifically at international commercial arbitration, it is 
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built on the recognition that “teleological interpretation has traditionally played a part in the 
interpretation of multilateral, ‘legislative’ conventions.”485   
Under a teleological approach, courts should “determine whether there is consensus on 
the answer to the question at hand – not generally among all countries which lend their support 
to the international arbitration system, but rather among jurisdictions in which the provisions at 
issue are also in effect.”486  If a single internationally acceptable norm can be identified, then that 
standard should be used by the court.
487
 
The situation is slightly more difficult if a single norm cannot be identified, even after an 
appropriately comparative analysis has been completed.
488
  However, if the instrument to be 
construed is the New York Convention, then the court may turn to the interpretive techniques 
outlined in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention to determine what standard should 
apply.
489
  Because the New York Convention is intended “to unify certain areas of the law,” 
courts must “refrain from assuming that . . . terms” used in the Convention “unquestionably” 
have the same meaning that they do in domestic legislation.
490
  Furthermore,  
consideration should be given to the practice of states parties to the treaty (which 
practice includes decisions rendered by their courts, as well as statutes giving an 
indication of their understanding of the meaning and effect of the treaty’s 
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 Recourse also can and should be had to the travaux préparatoires, although these documents 
play “a less important role than the factors just alluded to.”492   
Although the teleological approach bears certain similarities to techniques adopted under 
both the Vienna Convention and the borrowed treaty rule, the emphasis on international 
consensus appears to be unique to this particular interpretive mode.
493
  Focusing on whether a 
particular state has “signalled [its] willingness to support the international arbitration system” 
provides a useful normative context, since it avoids interpreting the New York Convention and 
the relevant incorporative statutes in a vacuum and instead concentrates on the purpose of the 
treaty.
494
  The teleological approach also avoids problems of over-breadth by limiting itself to 
“questions of international arbitration law to which local sources offer no obvious answer.”495  
Although this is somewhat similar to the way in which the Charming Betsy canon limits itself to 
ambiguous statutes, the teleological approach addresses a different subset of problems and is 
somewhat more comprehensive in that it also takes the possibility of conflicting case law (a 
significant problem in the United States) into account.
496
  
However, the teleological approach also suffers from some potential problems.  The 
biggest concern may be its somewhat free-floating nature.  U.S. courts appreciate hard and fast 
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rules, even (or particularly) in areas involving constitutional and international law, and the 
teleological approach may not provide the necessary degree of methodological specificity.
497
   
A second issue involves the propriety of a teleological approach as a matter of U.S. law.  
Although purposive interpretation does have a place in U.S. law, such practices are not currently 
in favor, given the contemporary preference for textualism.
498
  As a result, it appears unlikely 




Although specialists in the field have long been aware of the many complexities that can arise in 
cases involving international commercial arbitration, courts and commentators in other areas of 
law are only now being introduced to the diverse and difficult issues that can and do arise in 
disputes involving the New York Convention and the FAA.
499
  While a number of public and 
private entities are taking steps to help courts, commentators, arbitrators and advocates 
understand the nuances of the U.S. law of international commercial arbitration,
500
 these efforts 
are in many ways too little and too late.  Several significant circuit splits involving international 
commercial arbitration already exist, with more appearing likely to arise in the coming years.
501
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Most analysts consider these lines of cases in light of their various factual similarities.
502
  
Though helpful in some regards, those kinds of narrow, subject-specific analyses overlook a 
number of important commonalities that arise as a matter of constitutional and public 
international law.  Focusing on these broader issues, as this Article has done, not only provides 
the U.S. judiciary with an opportunity to establish a standard interpretive method that cuts across 
all aspects of international commercial arbitration, thereby avoiding the practical and 
jurisprudential problems associated with a more fragmented approach,
503
 it also increases the 
likelihood that courts will render decisions that comply with the United States’ international 
obligations under the New York Convention.
504
  
One of the primary means by which these ends are achieved involves characterizing 
Chapter 2 of the FAA not as implementing legislation per se but as an incorporative statute that 
can be either facilitative or enabling in nature.  This technique is particularly useful because it 
avoids difficult questions relating to whether the New York Convention is self-executing.
505
  
While this approach might be intellectually unfulfilling to those people who prefer a more direct, 
black-or-white analysis, Cass Sunstein has emphasized the benefits of incompletely theorized 
agreements in the area of constitutional law, and such agreements may also be usefully adopted 
with respect to matters relating to the interpretation of treaties like the New York Convention.
506
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Framing Chapter 2 of the FAA as incorporative also puts an entirely new spin on the 
relationship between the New York Convention and domestic law and allows U.S. courts to 
adopt a new and potentially more accurate means of interpreting and applying the relevant legal 
provisions.
507
  Several alternative methodologies have been discussed herein, including various 
iterations of the Charming Betsy canon as well as the borrowed treaty rule and a subject-specific 
teleological approach.
508
  Although each interpretive technique has its benefits, the borrowed 
treaty rule appears to achieve the best and most appropriate results as a matter of constitutional 
and international law.  Not only does the borrowed treaty rule take into account the purpose and 
nature of incorporative statutes, it also appears to balance the concerns of nationalists and 
nationalists in a principled and constitutionally valid manner.   
Furthermore, the borrowed treaty rule resonates comfortably with the core values of 
international commercial arbitration, even though the rule was developed in the context of U.S. 
constitutional law.  This consistency of aim is vitally important, given the sophistication and 
maturity of contemporary arbitral practice around the world and the special status accorded to 
international commercial arbitration by U.S. courts.
509
  International commercial arbitration has 
achieved a level of legitimacy to which other disciplines can only aspire,
510
 and any interpretive 
theory that does not take these well-established practices and principles into account cannot hold 
weight. 
Although this Article has focused primarily on matters relating to international 
commercial arbitration, the insights and conclusions provided herein may be equally useful to 
scholars and practitioners specializing in other fields.  International commercial arbitration 
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provides a wealth of empirical and comparative data about how international treaties are 
interpreted and applied around the world, which means that theories about arbitration are rooted 
in longstanding and widespread practical experience.  As a result, models developed in 
international commercial arbitration can provide valuable lessons to courts and commentators 
working in other areas of law. 
It is, of course, possible to carry an analogy too far, and it may very well be that the 
economic underpinnings of international commercial arbitration provide states, courts and parties 
with certain incentives or justifications that do not exist in other contexts.
511
  However, the 
widespread success of the New York Convention and the international arbitral regime suggests 
that this is a field that is eminently worthy of study.
512
 
As comprehensive as this Article has tried to be, there is much work left to be done as a 
matter of both constitutional and public international law.  Hopefully, this discussion will act as 
an inspiration for further developments, initiatives and research by both public and private 
bodies, for only by understanding the complex interaction of constitutional and public 
international law can U.S. courts appreciate and appropriately address the various challenges that 
currently exist in international commercial arbitration. 
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